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Abstract
A negotiation team is a set of agents with common and possibly also conflicting preferences that forms one
of the parties of a negotiation. A negotiation team is involved in two decision making processes simulta-
neously, a negotiation with the opponents, and an intra-team process to decide on the moves to make in
the negotiation. This article focuses on negotiation team decision making for circumstances that require
unanimity of team decisions. Existing agent-based approaches only guarantee unanimity in teams negoti-
ating in domains exclusively composed of predictable and compatible issues. This article presents a model
for negotiation teams that guarantees unanimous team decisions in domains consisting of predictable and
compatible, and alsounpredictable issues. Moreover, the article explores the influence of using opponent, and
team member models in the proposing strategies that team members use. Experimental results show that
the team benefits if team members employ Bayesian learning to model their teammates’ preferences.
Keywords: Automated negotiation, Multi-agent systems, Agreement technologies
1. Introduction
In the last decade, there has been an increase
in the profit earned by electronic commerce sys-
tems. This increase has lead to a strong interest
of the academic world in researching problems re-
lated to e-commerce (Ngai and Wat, 2002; Grieger,
2003; Wareham et al., 2005). As of today, most e-
commerce systems rely on users manually browsing
their catalogs and selecting which goods they desire
to buy. This task may end up being time consuming
and suboptimal in terms of users’ preferences, es-
pecially as the number of items and services offered
on the Web increases. Therefore, it is necessary
to propose mechanisms that helps costumers take
better decisions while saving their time efforts.
Agent-based electronic commerce has been pro-
posed as a solution to such problems (Guttman
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et al., 1998; Sierra and Dignum, 2001; Oliveira and
Rocha, 2001; He et al., 2003). In an agent-based e-
commerce system, autonomous agents act on behalf
of their users with the goal of finding and closing
satisfactory deals. Automated negotiation is one
of the most common approaches when implement-
ing these systems since they allow different elec-
tronic parties to reach agreements by exchanging
offers and feedback (Lomuscio et al., 2003; Nguyen
and Jennings, 2005; Buffett and Spencer, 2007; lau,
2007; Chan et al., 2008). The benefits of automated
negotiation and agent-based e-commerce are many.
Being brief, some of the most important include:
• As stated, browsing online catalogs for an op-
timal deal may be time consuming. The state-
of-the-art in automated negotiation can com-
plete complex negotiations for multiple issues
in less than a few minutes (Klein et al., 2003a;
Williams et al., 2011; Baarslag et al., 2012).
• On the one hand, automated negotiation saves
the user from having to browse the entire cata-
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log. Additionally, its personal agent is directed
by the preferences of the user in the negotia-
tion, which should result in deals that are ad-
justed to the personal liking of the individual.
Personalization has been reported to increase
user satisfaction in many computational sys-
tems (Ball et al., 2006; Liang et al., 2007). On
the other hand, a dynamic process like auto-
mated negotiation allows sellers to adapt their
deals to the users’ preferences, their current
business needs, and their competitor dynamics
(He et al., 2003).
• Agreements achieved by human negotiators,
suffer from the leaving money on the nego-
tiation table effect (Thompson, 2003). This
means that human negotiators are content
with current agreements, which are usually
suboptimal, when they could have performed
much better. Agents in automated negotiation
have been reported to provide agreements close
to the optimal solution (Lai et al., 2008).
• Compared to centralized and offline ap-
proaches (e.g., preference aggregation, recom-
mendation approaches, etc.), automated nego-
tiation is a dynamic and parallel process. For
instance, some centralized approaches like pref-
erence aggregation are computationally hard
especially if the preference space is combina-
torial (Chevaleyre et al., 2007). On the other
hand, recommendation approaches only filter
prospective deals, but they do not close specific
contracts adapted to business needs. Contrar-
ily, automated negotiation can be adapted to
current business needs (e.g., concede to gain
customers and close fast deals). Additionally,
as stated above, team members are also moti-
vated by their own personal interests. There-
fore, it is possible that some team members
show opportunistic behavior inside the team.
In such cases, preference aggregation may be
manipulated by exaggerating preferences. Ad-
ditionally, each parties’ preferences are private,
therefore making it difficult for the other par-
ties to exploit and manipulate. This latter fac-
tor is important, since nowadays most users in
electronic applications care about the informa-
tion they filtrate in systems (Taylor, 2003).
Most negotiation mechanisms proposed for e-
commerce settings have focused on solving bilat-
eral or multiparty negotiations where parties are
individual agents (Faratin et al., 1998; Zeng and
Sycara, 1998; Klein et al., 2003b; Nguyen and Jen-
nings, 2005; Coehoorn and Jennings, 2004; Buf-
fett and Spencer, 2007; Lai et al., 2008; Williams
et al., 2011; Sanchez-Anguix et al., 2013; Aydog˘an
and Yolum, 2012). However, some real life scenar-
ios involve negotiation parties that are not neces-
sarily formed by single individuals. Instead, each
party may be formed by more than a single individ-
ual. For instance, imagine that a group of travelers
wants to go on a holiday together. As a group, they
have to negotiate with several travel agencies to get
the best travel package for the group. Despite shar-
ing a common goal, each member in the multiplayer
party may also be motivated by its own personal
interests Mannix (2005); Halevy (2008). Therefore,
the group not only faces a possibly difficult nego-
tiation with the travel agency, but it also needs to
deal with the conflict present in the group. This
type of multi-individual negotiating party has been
studied in the social sciences under the name of ne-
gotiation team (Thompson et al., 1996; Brodt and
Thompson, 2001).
As far as the authors are concerned, multi-
individual parties have been overlooked in auto-
mated negotiation research. The use of computa-
tional models for negotiation teams opens doors for
new types of interesting and novel applications in
electronic commerce. The inclusion of agent-based
negotiation teams allows for e-commerce systems to
deploy dynamic deal mechanisms for groups, mak-
ing of e-commerce a more social system. Classi-
cally, when purchasing for groups in e-commerce
systems, one representative takes decisions for the
whole group. Either he makes decisions accord-
ing to his own preferences or the group needs to
engage in a human negotiation which is usually a
costly process due to different schedules, logistics,
lack of communication problems or interpersonal
conflict (Behfar et al., 2008). With the inclusion
of agent-based negotiation teams these problems
are eluded since autonomous agents take decisions
jointly while saving time and efforts for their users.
We believe that agent-based negotiation teams
could provide potentially interesting new services :
• Electronic markets for groups of travelers:
Online travel agencies offer their services by
means of online catalogs where users can
browse different products like flights, hotels,
restaurants, activities, etc. The possibili-
ties for travels are vast, and usually a single
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travel operator may offer thousands of possi-
ble trip packages/services. Exhaustively look-
ing through this online catalog for an optimal
deal becomes an unfeasible task for humans.
Additionally, more often than not, travel is a
social activity for groups (e.g., friends, family,
young people, etc.). Users can benefit from
agent-based negotiation teams since they can
exhaustively look for deals while taking the
preferences of the group into account and sav-
ing efforts. Service providers can also bene-
fit from these models since they could adapt
their business strategies in a dynamic way and
add a level of personalization that may help to
retain customers. Moreover, offering the pos-
sibility for groups to close travel deals based
on their preferences is a value-added service,
that as far as we know, is not currently of-
fered by the industry. As an example of its
application, users may indicate to their per-
sonal agents their desire to go on a travel to-
gether. Then, the agents prepare to negotiate
with different travel agencies in order to pro-
vide a complete and satisfactory travel package
for the users. The fact that the negotiation is
carried out automatically by electronic agents
also gives room to looking for several alterna-
tives in parallel. Once several trip packages
have been negotiated, the personal agents may
communicate the agreements to users, who can
validate them in the last instance.
• Electronic support for agricultural coopera-
tives: Agricultural cooperatives are supposed
to be democratic institutions where groups of
farmers join together to save resources for the
distribution of their products. One of the main
problems of agricultural cooperatives is the
principal-agent problem (Ortmann and King,
2007). Basically, despite being democratic in-
stitutions, agricultural cooperatives are man-
aged by a board of directors who take deci-
sions on behalf of the democratic institution.
It has been reported in the literature (Ort-
mann and King, 2007) that dissatisfaction in
cooperatives comes from the fact that the goals
of members are not aligned with those of the
managers. As a novel application for electronic
commerce, agent-based negotiation teams may
provide support for the processes that are car-
ried out by cooperatives. For instance, the
negotiations between agricultural cooperatives
and distributors may be supported by an elec-
tronic market where the agricultural coopera-
tive is modeled as an agent-based negotiation
team. Each member may be represented by an
electronic and personal agent that participates
in the negotiation team according to the pref-
erences of its owner. This way, if the model
is capable of ensuring unanimity with regards
to team decisions, it may be possible to avoid
the principal-agent problem. Of course, agri-
cultural cooperatives are large institutions and
considerable research has still to be done to
provide scalable and fair computational mod-
els. However, research as the one presented in
this article contributes to the obtention of such
models in the long term.
• Groups of energy producers in the smart grid:
The smart grid is addressed to be the next
generation network for electricity distribution
(Farhangi, 2010). In this network, energy
generation may come from geographically dis-
tributed small generators (e.g., green energy
generators) that have to compete with large
energy producers. Decisions at the smart grid
have to be taken dynamically since energy pro-
duction and consumption may vary or face un-
expected events (Ramchurn et al., 2012). Re-
cently, agent-based electronic commerce has
been proposed as proper paradigm for this sce-
nario due to its dynamic nature and adaptive
response (Brazier et al., 2002; Lamparter et al.,
2010; Morais et al., 2012; Ramchurn et al.,
2012). If small generators want to compete
with large generators like power plants, they
may need to group together and act together
as a single generator. Agent-based negotiation
teams can give support for the group decision
making of small generators in a dynamic en-
vironment like the smart grid. For instance,
an agent-based negotiation team for the smart
grid may decide on different contract attributes
like energy price for different time slots, con-
tract duration and cancellation fees with dif-
ferent energy consumers.
The applications described above present benefits
for electronic commerce systems. However, there
are still several issues that need to be solved for de-
ploying real applications based on agent-based ne-
gotiation teams due to the novelty of the topic. One
of the main issues that should be addressed when
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designing agent-based negotiation team models is
unanimity. The authors argue that, whenever it is
possible, it is desirable for the final agreement with
the opponent to be unanimously acceptable for all
of the team members. When the members of the
negotiation team are going to interact in the long
term, the intra-team strategy should avoid one or
some of the team members being clearly at disad-
vantage (e.g., unacceptable deal) with respect to
the other team members. In the first place, the
aforementioned situation may end up in users per-
ceiving unfairness, which may affect commitment
to the decision, group attachment, and trust (Ko-
rsgaard et al., 1995). And second, but not the least
important, users that are not satisfied with agree-
ments found automatically may end up leaving the
electronic commerce application.
The existing approaches (Sanchez-Anguix et al.,
2011, 2012a,b) have focused on achieving unani-
mously acceptable agreements for negotiation do-
mains exclusively comprised by predictable and
compatible issues among the team members. An
issue is predictable and compatible if the preference
order over issue values is the same for team mem-
bers and this fact is known from the domain (e.g.,
price in a team of buyers). While some e-commerce
domains are exclusively composed by these issues,
many domains also contain issues whose preferen-
tial ordering over issue values is not known from the
domain (i.e., unpredictable issues). For instance, it
is difficult to predict from a set of cities which rank-
ing represents the preferences of a traveler, which
can diverge from the preferences of other travelers.
This article advances the state of the art in agent-
based electronic commerce in two different ways.
Firstly, it introduces a new model for agent-based
negotiation teams, which could support dynamic
negotiations for groups of autonomous agents rep-
resenting their users. Secondly, the present model
is capable of assuring that the final agreement is
unanimously acceptable for all of the team mem-
bers in domains that contain both predictable and
compatible and unpredictable issues. We propose an
intra-team protocol in which a team mediator helps
team members to reach unanimously acceptable de-
cisions. Furthermore, we propose two negotiation
strategies for team members: a basic negotiation
strategy based on concession tactics and a nego-
tiation strategy using Bayesian learning to model
teammates’ and opponent’s preferences for unpre-
dictable issues. The model is capable of outper-
forming state-of-the-art approaches for agent-based
negotiation teams. We describe our general frame-
work in Section 2 and the intra-team protocol that
allows team members to reach unanimity in Section
3. After that, we propose two negotiation strategies
for team members in Section 4 and we explain why
unanimity is guaranteed among team members in
Section 5. After analyzing the experiments in Sec-
tion 6, we relate our work to existing approaches
and discuss future lines of work in Section 7.
2. Overview of the Negotiation Framework
Let A represent a negotiation team consisting of
|A| = M different team members and a trusted
team mediator medA, and let a ∈ A represent a
team member in negotiation team A. Let op rep-
resent the opponent party of the negotiation team.
The negotiation between team and opponent is car-
ried out in a bilateral fashion, using an alternating-
offers protocol (Rubinstein, 1982). In this proto-
col, one of the two parties is the initiating party
and sends the first offer to the other party or re-
sponding party. The responding party receives the
offer and decides whether or not he/she accepts the
offer. Accordingly, she or he may accept the cur-
rent offer or send a counter-offer. If the responding
agent sends a counter-offer, the initiating party has
to decide whether he/she accepts the counter-offer
or not. If the counter-offer is rejected, the process
is repeated in a turn-taking fashion until a deal is
mutually accepted (successful negotiation) or one
of the parties decides to quit the negotiation since
its deadline has been reached (failed negotiation).
Concerning inter-party communications, the team
mediator interacts with the opponent by sending
team’s proposals and transmitting opponent deci-
sions to team members. The team mediator plays a
key role since it coordinates the team members and
helps them reach unanimously acceptable deals.
Let X be the object under negotiation, j ∈
{1, ..., n} be the issues under negotiation, Dj be the
negotiation domain or valid values for issue j and
xj ∈ Dj represent a valid value for issue j. Each
agent’s preferences are represented by means of a
private additive utility function. We assume that
there is no preferential interdependency among ne-
gotiation issues; that is, the valuation given to a
certain issue does not affect preference on the valua-
tion of other negotiation issues. The utility function
for an agent in our framework can be formalized as
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follows:
U(X) = w1V1(x1)+w2V2(x2)+...+wnVn(xn). (1)
where wj represents the importance given to issue
j by the agent, and Vj : xj → [0, 1] is a scoring
function for issue j that gives the score that the
agent assigns to an issue value xj . It is assumed
that
n∑
j=1
wa,j = 1 and wa,j ≥ 0, and then U(.) is
a function scaled in [0,1], where 0 represents the
least desirable negotiation deals, and 1 represents
the most desirable negotiation deals. For agents,
RU ∈ [0, 1] represents the reservation utility or the
minimum level of utility to consider an agreement
as acceptable.
In the proposed framework, private information
and bounded rationality are assumed. The former
has been introduced above: information regarding
agents’ preferences is private, and so are the strate-
gies and minimum acceptable values of each agent.
This is true even among team members, since prior
to the negotiation they do not know any informa-
tion regarding other teammates’ preferences. The
only information available is obtained via interac-
tions in the intra-team protocol. The latter refers
to the fact that given the limited time, informa-
tion privacy, and limited computational resources,
agents cannot calculate the optimal strategy to be
carried out during the negotiation. Instead, they
employ heuristic strategies that aim to be as good
as possible in terms of the achievable utility.
2.1. Unanimously acceptable agreements
Each team member a ∈ A has a reservation util-
ity RUa ∈ [0, 1] that represents the minimum util-
ity that satisfies the team member’s need. Each
outcome whose utility is lower than the reservation
utility is unacceptable for the team member. As
stated along this article, we consider that unanim-
ity in a negotiation team is of extreme importance.
An offer is unanimously acceptable for a team A if
it is acceptable for all of the team members inside
the negotiation team:
∀a ∈ A,Ua(X) ≥ RUa. (2)
The proposed intra-team strategy will assure
that team members only accept those offers that
are unanimously acceptable for all the team mem-
bers and that offers proposed to the opponent are
over each team members’ reservation utilities, thus,
making it unanimously acceptable.
2.2. Types of negotiation issues among team mem-
bers
Among the different negotiation issues that com-
pose the negotiation domain, we consider that
there are issues that are predictable and compatible
among team members and issues that are unpre-
dictable among team members.
Formally, we can define an issue j with domain
Dj as compatible among team members if for each
possible pair of team members a, b ∈ A and for
each pair of issue values v1, v2 ∈ Dj , the following
expression is true:
Va,j(v2) > Va,j(v1)→ Vb,j(v2) ≥ Vb,j(v1). (3)
Hence, an issue is compatible among team members
if one of the team members can increase its utility
by selecting a certain issue value with respect to
the current assignment, then the rest of team mem-
bers stay at the same utility or they also increase
their utility. Thus, there is no preferential conflict
among issue values between the team members, and
there is full potential for cooperation among team
members with respect to compatible issues. Figure
1 shows two examples of compatible issues among
two agents (top part) and an example of a non com-
patible issue (bottom part). As it can be observed,
in the case of price (top left), both agents obtain a
better valuation when choosing a lower price value
with respect to a high price value. Thus, Equation
3 holds and it is a compatible issue for both agents.
In the case of the city of destination (top right), the
issue is also compatible among the two agents. For
any pair of cities, if one of the agents prefers one of
the cities with respect to other city, the other agent
also holds the same preferential relationship. For
instance, both agents prefer Paris to Berlin, Berlin
to London, and London to Madrid. However, in the
case of the type of room (bottom part), the blue
agent prefers an individual room with respect to an
apartment, whereas the red agent prefers exactly
the opposite. Thus, there is no full potential for co-
operation among team members in that negotiation
issue since conflict is present.
The concept of predictability and unpredictabil-
ity (Hindriks and Tykhonov, 2010; Marsa-Maestre
et al., 2013) is related to vertical and horizon-
tal issues found in economics literature (Stole,
1995). The definition of predictable issues matches
with vertical issues, while the definition of un-
predictable issues matches with horizontal issues.
From this point on, we will use the concepts of
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Figure 1: Two compatible issues among two agents (top) and a non compatible issue among two agents (bottom).
unpredictable/predictable and we will briefly intro-
duce them. An issue is predictable for an agent if
the preference ordering of issue values is known in
the negotiation domain. Therefore, an issue is com-
patible and predictable among team members if the
preferences regarding issue values are known in the
negotiation domain and increasing the utility of one
of the team members by selecting one specific issue
value results in other team members staying at the
same utility or also increasing their respective util-
ities. For instance, from the examples in Figure 1,
one can consider that inside a team of buyers the
price is a compatible and predictable issue among
team members since it is known that all of the buy-
ers prefer low prices to high prices, and reducing
the price results in all of the buyers increasing their
utility or staying at the same utility. On the other
hand, an issue is unpredictable among team mem-
bers if the preference ordering of the issue values
cannot be accurately predicted and Equation 3 may
not hold for that issue. In the case of Figure 1,
the city of destination is a compatible issue among
the two agents. Nevertheless, in a travel negotia-
tion domain it is not true that all of the travelers
will hold the same preference ranking over the issue
values and without additional knowledge, the pref-
erence ordering may not be predicted accurately.
Hence, it is an unpredictable issue. With respect
to the type of room, the preference ordering over
issue values may vary for the travelers. Moreover,
we cannot predict their preference ordering directly,
thus making the issue unpredictable.
In this framework, PR denotes the set of pre-
dictable and compatible issues among team mem-
bers, while UN denotes the set of unpredictable is-
sues.
2.3. Forbidden unpredictable partial offers among
team members
We define an unpredictable partial offer X
′
as
a partial offer that has a concrete instantiation
of all the unpredictable issues in UN. The utility
of an unpredictable partial offer is calculated as
Ua(X
′
) =
∑
j∈UN
wa,jVa,j(xj).
For a team member a ∈ A, an unpredictable par-
tial offer X
′
will never be part of an acceptable offer
(i.e., it will never be an unanimously acceptable of-
fer for the team) when the sum of the utility of X
′
and the maximum utility that can be obtained from
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predictable issues maxPRa =
∑
j∈PR
wa,j is less than
its reservation value RUa, since any full offer that
completes X
′
is below the reservation utility. For a
team member a, we refer to the set of unpredictable
partial offers that will never be part of an accept-
able offer as forbidden unpredictable partial offers,
Fa (see Equation 4).
Fa = {X ′ |Ua(X ′) +maxPRa < RUa} (4)
It is worth noting that Fa does not represent the
whole negotiation space that is unacceptable for a,
but just a portion of it. In fact, some unpredictable
partial offers that are not contained in Fa, can be-
come unacceptable when the agent does not get the
value needed from predictable issues. The size of Fa
may grow as the reservation utility increases. Thus,
agents with high reservation utilities are expected
to have larger sets of Fa than agents with low reser-
vation utilities.
2.4. Case of Study
In this article we have employed a case of study
(i.e., a negotiation domain) that is extracted from
a possible tourism electronic market. The case of
study is used to illustrate and test the proposed
negotiation framework.
A group of travelers wants to go on a holiday
together and arrange their accommodation. The
group negotiates with a hotel on the following is-
sues.
• Price (p): It represents the price per night
that each traveler pays to the hotel for the
booking service. The value goes from 200$,
which is the minimum rate applicable by the
hotel, to 400$, which is the maximum rate
found in the hotel. This negotiation issue is
considered to be predictable and compatible
among team members since all of the travel-
ers obviously prefer low prices to high prices.
Contrarily, the hotel prefers high prices to low
prices.
• Cancellation fee (cf ): This issue represents
the amount of the final price that each friend
pays if the reservation is canceled. Possible
values for this negotiation issue go from 0% to
50%. This is a predictable and compatible is-
sue among team members since all of the trav-
elers prefer low cancellation fees to high can-
cellation fees. On the contrary, the opponent
prefers high cancellation fees to low cancella-
tion fees.
• Arranged Foods Included (af ): The hotel
may also offer some meals included in deal with
the travelers. The type of meal plans included
are none, breakfast, breakfast+lunch, break-
fast+dinner, lunch+dinner, and all. In our ne-
gotiation scenario, we have considered that this
negotiation issue is unpredictable among team
members since preferences of team members on
this issue may vary and it cannot be assumed
to be same for each member.
• Type of room (tr): The four travelers can
be accommodated in different types of room
depending on their preferences. More specif-
ically, the hotel offers 4 individual rooms, 2
twin rooms, 1 triple and 1 individual room, or
1 apartment. The type of room is an unpre-
dictable negotiation issue among team mem-
bers.
• Payment method (pm): The amount of
money paid by the travelers may be paid by
different methods. The hotel allows for the
payment to be made in cash, via credit card,
by bank transfer, in a 3 months deferred pay-
ment through the bank, and in a 6 months de-
ferred payment. This negotiation issue is un-
predictable since team members may prefer to
choose different payment methods and we can-
not predict their preference ordering directly.
• Room orientation (ro): If possible, the team
members can decide upon an orientation for
the balcony of their rooms. The different op-
tions are inner garden, main street, pool, sea,
and outer garden. This issue is also considered
an unpredictable issue among team members.
• Free amenity (fa): As a token of generos-
ity for booking as a group, the hotel offers one
free service to all of the team members. More
specifically, the team members can choose be-
tween gym service, free wi-fi, 1 free drink per
day, 1 free spa session, pool service, cable tv
service, and one free guided tour. Since the
preferences of team members vary for this is-
sue and no assumption about their preferences
can be made, this issue is also considered as
unpredictable.
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To sum up, for this case study we have that
PR= {p,cf } and UN = {af ,tr ,pm,ro,fa} with a to-
tal of 4200 different combinations of discrete issue
values (af,tr,pm,ro,fa) and two real issues (p,cf ).
We assume that the team mediator knows which is-
sues are predictable and can apply an operator that
determines the best value for team members from a
given set. For unpredictable issues, team members
can have different types of valuation functions and
the mediator does not know which issue values are
better for team members. Each team member may
assign different weights (i.e., priorities) to negotia-
tion issues and the opponent’s valuation functions
and issue weights may be different from those of
team members. The team mediator does not know
the weights given by agents to the different issues.
3. Intra-Team Protocol
In a negotiation involving a negotiation team,
the intra-team protocol defines how and when de-
cisions are taken regarding the negotiation. In this
framework, we propose an intra-team protocol that
is governed by the trusted team mediator medA.
Basically, the team mediator regulates the interac-
tions that can be carried out among team mem-
bers and, accordingly, helps team members reach-
ing unanimous acceptable decisions inside the team
during the negotiation. The proposed protocol is
clearly differentiated into two different phases: Pre-
negotiation and Negotiation. On the one hand, dur-
ing the pre-negotiation, the mediator helps team
members identifying potential offers that are not
unanimously acceptable for every teammate. On
the other hand, during the negotiation the mediator
coordinates the offer proposal mechanism, which is
composed of a voting process for unpredictable is-
sues and an iterated building process for predictable
issues, and the offer acceptance mechanism for of-
fers that come from the opponent. We describe
those phases in a detailed way in the following sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2. An overview of all of the com-
munications carried out in the negotiation model
are depicted in Figure 2. It specifies the protocols
carried out within the team and the communica-
tions carried out with the opponent by means of
Agent UML (Bauer et al., 2001) sequence diagrams.
More detailed views of the intra-team protocols for
the pre-negotiation, evaluation opponent’s propos-
als and proposing offers can be observed in Figures
3, 4, and 5 respectively.
3.1. Pre-negotiation Phase
In the pre-negotiation phase, the mediator co-
ordinates the following intra-team protocol to dis-
cover the set of forbidden unpredictable partial of-
fers FA for the team . The set of forbidden unpre-
dictable partial offers for the team, FA, is defined
as FA = {X ′|∃a ∈ A,X ′ ∈ Fa}. This means that
any unpredictable partial offer in FA is never part
of an acceptable offer for at least one team mem-
ber. Thus, these unpredictable partial offers should
be avoided for the team since the goal of the nego-
tiation model is reaching unanimously acceptable
agreements.
A formal description of the pre-negotiation pro-
tocol is presented in Figure 3. The picture describes
the protocol by means of Agent UML sequence di-
agrams. According to the proposed protocol, the
team mediator initiates the pre-negotiation phase
by asking each team member a to calculate its
own set of forbidden unpredictable partial offers Fa
(message 1 in Figure 3). Each team member builds
its own (forbidden) set as requested, and it is com-
municated to the mediator privately (message 2 in
Figure 3). When the mediator receives the sets from
the team members, it aggregates them in order to
construct the set of forbidden unpredictable partial
offers for team A, FA =
⋃
a∈A
Fa. Then, the team
mediator makes public the list of forbidden unpre-
dictable partial offers of the team FA (message 3
in Figure 3). It should be stated that, since any
unpredictable partial offer in this set will prevent
one of the team members from reaching its reser-
vation utility, the team is not allowed to generate
an offer involving any of these partial offers in FA.
After the team mediator has shared FA with team
members, the negotiation phase starts.
The reader may realize that it is possible that
during this phase, most of the unpredictable par-
tial offers are pruned. In that case, it means that
there is little potential for cooperation among team
members. This issue can be observed by the team
mediator prior to starting any negotiation process.
In that case, the team mediator may suggest the
team not to negotiate and save the computational
resources used in the negotiation. If the team is
not static and can be dynamically formed, it may
suggest team members to disband the team and
look for other potential partners. However, this
team/coalition formation(Gaston and desJardins,
2005; Rahwan et al., 2009) is outside of the scope
of this work since we focus on studying the perfor-
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Figure 2: Overview of the communications carried out by the team mediator.
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Figure 3: Overview of the intra-team protocol carried out during the pre-negotiation
mance of the negotiation model. We consider the
use of the information provided with forbidden un-
predictable partial offers for negotiation team for-
mation as a future line of work. In general, combi-
nations of team members that prune a small portion
of the space should be more similar among them,
and it should be more easy to achieve cooperation.
3.2. Negotiation Phase
In the negotiation, two mechanisms are carried
out at each round: a mechanism for deciding to ac-
cept/reject the opponent’s offer (Evaluation of Op-
ponent’s Offer), and a mechanism for proposing an
offer to the opponent (Offer Proposal). For the for-
mer, a unanimity voting process is employed, while
for the latter an offer building process is governed
by the team mediator.
3.2.1. Evaluation of Opponent’s Offer
This mechanism is carried out each time the team
mediator receives an offer from the opponent. Since
the main goal of the proposed intra-team strategy
is achieving unanimously acceptable agreements for
the team, a unanimity voting is carried out to de-
cide whether or not the opponent’s offer is accept-
able for the team. With this mechanism, as long
as one of the team members is not satisfied with
the opponent’s offer, the offer is not accepted by
the team, precluding the team from reaching agree-
ments that are not unanimously acceptable. A for-
malization of the protocol followed in this mech-
anism can be observed in Figure 4. The picture
shows the formalization employing sequence dia-
grams from Agent UML. The intra-team protocol
used for this mechanism goes as follows. First, the
team mediator receives the offer Xt from the op-
ponent at time t. If Xt involves any forbidden un-
predictable partial offer in FA, the opponent offer
is automatically rejected. However, the opponent’s
offer is also informed to team members in order to
allow each team member to process the new infor-
mation leaked by the opponent if they see it nec-
essary (message 1 in Figure 4). Otherwise, if the
combination of unpredictable issue values is not in
FA, in order to see whether the offer is unanimously
acceptable for team members, the mediator makes
the opponent’s offer public among team members
and starts an anonymous voting process (message
2 in Figure 4). Each team member a ∈ A states
to the mediator whether he is willing to accept Xt
(positive vote) or to reject it (negative vote) at that
specific instant (messages 3.a or 3.b in Figure 4).
Since our aim is to guarantee unanimity, the offer
is only accepted if all of the team members emit a
positive vote (message 4.a in Figure 4). Otherwise,
the offer is rejected and a counter-offer is proposed
as explained in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.2. Offer Proposal
Proposing an offer to the opponent is a complex
task, since the space of offers may be huge and the
preferences of the team members should be reflected
in the offer sent to the opponent, and, in our case,
the offer sent should be unanimously acceptable for
team members. The process is divided into two
sub-phases: constructing an unpredictable partial
offer, and setting up predictable issues. In both
phases, the team mediator acts according to Algo-
rithm 3.1. We include another formal description of
the interactions between the mediator and a team
member during the offer proposal. This informa-
tion can be found in Figure 5, which depicts the
intra-team protocol specified in and Agent UML
sequence diagram.
• Constructing an unpredictable partial
offer: The first step is to propose an un-
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Figure 4: Overview of the intra-team protocol employed to evaluate opponent’s offers.
predictable partial offer, a partial offer which
has all of the unpredictable issues instantiated.
Since team members know from FA the list of
unpredictable partial offers that will not re-
sult in unanimously acceptable offers under
any circumstance, any offer proposed by the
team should avoid being constructed from un-
predictable partial offers found in FA. The
method used to propose offers to the oppo-
nent relies on the fact that unpredictable is-
sues are those where intra-team conflict may
be present, whereas there is full potential for
cooperation in predictable and compatible is-
sues. Hence, in order to build an offer to be
sent to the opponent, it seems more appro-
priate to jointly set unpredictable issue val-
ues first and then, depending on the remaining
needs of team members, allow team members
to set compatible and predictable issues as they
require for reaching their demands. The pro-
posed mechanism for the first part, proposing
an unpredictable partial offer, is based on vot-
ing and social choice. The voting process goes
as follows.
1. The mediator asks each team member to
anonymously propose one unpredictable
partial offer X
′t
a (message 1 in Figure 5).
2. Each team member privately sends its
proposal to the mediator, who gathers
all of the proposals in a list that will be
later sent to team members. If any un-
predictable partial offer proposed by a is
contained in FA, the mediator automati-
cally ignores this proposal (message 2 in
Figure 5).
3. Once all of the proposals have been gath-
ered, the mediator makes public the list
of proposal UPO
′t among team mem-
bers and opens a Borda scoring process
(Nurmi, 2010) on proposed candidates
(message 3 in Figure 5).
4. Each team member anonymously scores
candidates and sends the scores to the
team mediator (message 4 in Figure 5).
5. The team mediator sums up scores and se-
lects the winner candidate with the high-
est score X
′t
A , making it public among
team members (message 5 in Figure 5).
This candidate, an unpredictable partial
offer, will be the base for the full offer that
will be sent to the opponent.
• Setting up predictable and compatible
issue values: Once unpredictable issues have
been set, it is necessary to set predictable and
compatible issues to construct a complete offer.
As it has been stated along this article, there
is full potential for cooperation among team
members in these issues since increasing the
utility of one of the team members by select-
ing one issue value will result in the other team
members staying at the same utility or increas-
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ing their utility. Obviously, the selected unpre-
dictable partial offer will not satisfy equally
the needs of all the team members. Never-
theless, team members can make use of pre-
dictable and compatible issues to satisfy their
remaining needs while not generating conflict
inside the team. To complete the partial offer
X
′t
A , an iterative mechanism that we proposed
in (Sanchez-Anguix et al., 2012a) is used to
build the final offer issue per issue. The mecha-
nism follows an order for predictable and com-
patible issues that is constructed by the me-
diator at each round according to the history
of the opponent’s concessions. The rationale
used to build this order is that the opponent
would concede less on those predictable issues
more important for him in the first negotia-
tion rounds, whereas it would concede more
on those predictable issues that are less impor-
tant. Thus, the order established by the team
mediator attempts to order predictable and
compatible issues in ascending order of impor-
tance for the opponent. The general idea be-
hind this ordering is attempting to satisfy team
members’ demands with those predictable is-
sues less important for the opponent first. The
order is updated as new information becomes
available from the offers sent by the opponent.
Based on this order, the iterative mechanism
goes as follows.
6. The mediator selects the first predictable
issue j and asks team members, given the
current partial offer X
′t
A , the necessary
value xj for j to get as close as possible
to their current demands (message 6 in
Figure 5).
7. Accordingly, each team member a informs
the mediator privately about the most
convenient value xa,j for that issue (mes-
sage 7 in Figure 5). To decide the final
value xj for the issue j, the trusted media-
tor aggregates agents’ opinions (since the
issue is predictable) by means of a func-
tion that, for team members, returns the
most preferred issue value from a given
set (best(.)). After deciding the value xj ,
X
′t
A is updated with xj .
8. The mediator asks the team whether or
not the new partial offer is already satis-
factory at round t (message 8 in Figure
5).
9. Each team member emits an affirmative
response if the current partial offer cov-
ers its current demands and a negative
response if it still has not covered its de-
mands (message 9.a or 9.b in Figure 5).
Those agents that agree with the current
state of X
′t
A leave the iterative mechanism
for this offer since they already are satis-
fied with the current partial offer. The
process steps back to the selection of the
next issue.
10. The process continues until all of the pre-
dictable issues have been set or until all
of the team members have left the it-
erative mechanism. In the latter case,
the remaining issues are set attempting
to maximize the opponent’s preferences.
Once the offer is complete, it is announced
among team members and sent to the op-
ponent (message 10.b in Figure 5).
Algorithm 3.1. Pseudo-algorithm for the offer
construction from the point of view of the medi-
ator. Send (message −→ condition ) means that
message is sent to every agent that fulfills condi-
tion
1:
2: /*Proposing an unpredictable offer*/
3: Send (REQUEST X
′t
a −→ ∀a ∈ A)
4: Receive (INFORM X
′t
a ←− ∀a ∈ A)
5: UPO
′t = (
⋃
a∈A
X
′t
a )− FA
6: Send (REQUEST Borda on UPO
′t −→ ∀a ∈
A)
7: Receive (INFORM scorea ←− ∀a ∈ A)
8: X
′t
A = argmax
X′∈UPO′t
∑
a∈A
score(a,X ′)
9: Send (INFORM X
′t
A ←− ∀a ∈ A)
10: order = build predictable order(); A′ = A
11:
12: /*Setting predictable issues*/
13: for all j ∈ order do
14: Send (REQUEST value for j −→ ∀a|a ∈ A′)
15: Receive (INFORM xa,j ←− ∀a|a ∈ A′)
16: xj = best({xa,j |a ∈ A′})
17: X
′t
A = X
′t
A
⋃{xj}
18: Send (REQUEST Satisfied with X
′t
A? −→
∀a ∈ A′)
19: for all a ∈ A′ do
20: Receive (INFORM ac′a(X
′t
A) ←− a)
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21: if ac′a(X
′t
A) = true then
22: A′ = A′ − {a}
23: end if
24: end for
25: if A′ = ∅ then
26: break;
27: end if
28: end for
29: for all j ∈ order ∧ issue not set(j) do
30: xj = maximize for opponent(j)
31: X
′t
A = X
′t
A
⋃{xj}
32: end for
33: XtA = X
′t
A
4. Team Members’ Strategies
The team mediator defines the coordination
mechanisms inside the team. However, each team
member’s internal strategy has a great effect on
team dynamics. In this article, we propose two
types of strategy for team members. According
to the first strategy (i.e., our basic team member),
the team member only proposes unpredictable par-
tial offers based on its own utility. In the second
strategy, team members model the preferences of
the team and the opponent on unpredictable par-
tial offers. Then, in the mechanism employed to
set unpredictable partial offers, each team member
selects the candidate that guarantees that it can
reach its current aspirations at time t, and max-
imizes the probability of being acceptable for the
opponent and the team. The learning mechanism
employed by these team members is Bayesian learn-
ing (i.e., Bayesian team member).
4.1. Basic Strategy for Team Members
Since negotiations are time-bounded in our
framework, we consider that team members have
to perform some kind of concession if an agreement
is to be found. For this purpose we have designed
basic team members as agents whose demands are
controlled by an individual and private concession
strategy. More specifically, the concession strategy
for a team member a ∈ A is based on time-based
tactics sa(t) (Faratin et al., 1998; Lai et al., 2008).
It estimates the utility demanded by a at time t
by using the formula in Equation 5, where RUa is
its reservation utility, T is the negotiation deadline,
and βa is the concession speed, which determines
how fast the agent’s demands are lowered towards
RUa.
sa(t) = 1− (1−RUa)× ( t
T
)
1
βa (5)
Based on this concession tactic, each team mem-
ber participates in the intra-team protocol with
their demands regulated by his private concession
tactic. Next, we define how team members take
their decisions: evaluating the opponent’s offer, and
proposing an offer for the opponent.
4.1.1. Evaluation of Opponent’s Offer
Given an offer Xt proposed by the opponent at
instant t, the team member emits a positive vote in
the unanimity voting process if it reports a utility
greater than or equal to its current demands sa(t).
Otherwise, a negative vote is emitted.
aca(X
t) =
{
true if sa(t) ≤ Ua(Xt)
false otherwise
(6)
4.1.2. Offer Proposal
As documented in Section 3.2, team members
interact at three points during the offer proposal.
First, they propose an unpredictable partial offer
to the team mediator. Since each team member a
has its demands regulated by a time-based tactic,
when proposing an unpredictable partial offer to the
mediator at instant t, the proposed unpredictable
partial offer X
′t
a fulfills:
X
′t
a /∈ FA ∧ (Ua(X
′t
a ) +maxPRa ≥ sa(t)) (7)
Hence, agent a selects an unpredictable partial
offer which is not forbidden inside the team (since
it will be ignored by the team mediator) and whose
utility allows him to achieve or surpass its current
demands at time t. This way, the team member as-
sures that if its proposed unpredictable partial offer
is the winner of the Borda voting process, it can
reach its current demands. However, one should be
aware that many unpredictable partial offers may
fulfill Equation 7. Therefore, it is necessary to se-
lect one of them as the proposed candidate. Being
our basic team member, from the set of partial of-
fers that fulfill Equation 7, a team member selects
one of the candidates randomly.
The second time that a team member interacts
with the team mediator is for scoring unpredictable
partial offers that have been proposed by team
members. For scoring candidate partial offers in
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Figure 5: Overview of the intra-team protocol carried out to propose offers to the other party.
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the Borda voting process, a basic team member or-
ders the candidates according to the partial utility
reported by each of the candidates. That is, the
team member assigns the highest score to the par-
tial offer whose utility is the highest for itself, and
the second highest score to the partial offer whose
utility is the second best one, and so forth.
Finally, team members also interact with the me-
diator during the mechanism used to set predictable
and compatible issues. When team members are
asked about a value for issue j, each team mem-
ber communicates anonymously the value xa,j . The
value is the one that, given the current partial offer
X
′t
A , gets the utility of the new partial offer as close
as possible to its current aspiration sa(t). Taking
normalized additive utility functions, it can be cal-
culated as:
xa,j =

argmax Va,j(x)
x∈Dj
if Ua(X
′t
A) + wa,j ≤ sa(t)
argmin Va,j(x)
x ∈ Dj
∧
wa,jVa,j(x) ≥ (sa(t)− Ua(X′tA ))
otherwise
(8)
where sa(t) is the utility demanded by the agent
a at round t, Ua(X
′t
A) is the utility reported by
the current partial offer, and wa,jVa,j(x) is the
weighted utility reported by the value demanded
by the agent. The value asked for issue j is the
closest one to the current demands of the agent.
On the one hand, if the agent cannot reach its cur-
rent demands by just setting issue j, it asks for the
value that reports the highest utility. On the other
hand, if the agent can reach or surpass its current
demands by setting j, it asks for the value that
makes the new partial offer the closest to the cur-
rent demands. In the same iterative process, team
members still have to declare whether or not they
are satisfied with the different partial offers that are
constructed. Team members follow a similar crite-
rion to the method proposed to determine if an op-
ponent offer is acceptable at t. Basically, a partial
offer is acceptable for an agent a at t if it reports a
utility greater than or equal to the aspiration level
marked by its concession strategy:
ac′a(X
′t
A) =
{
true if Ua(X
′t
A) ≥ sa(t)
false otherwise
(9)
where true indicates that the partial offer is ac-
ceptable at its current state for agent a, and false
indicates the opposite.
4.2. Bayesian-based Strategy for Team Members
The Bayesian-based negotiation strategy for a
team member is based on modeling the team’s (as
a whole) and its opponent’s preferences on unpre-
dictable issues, and acting accordingly. For this
purpose, two Bayesian models are employed to pre-
dict if unpredictable partial offers are acceptable
for both teammates and the opponent. One of the
Bayesian models is employed to capture the prefer-
ences of the team on unpredictable issues, whereas
the other is used for capturing the preferences of
the opponent on unpredictable issues. The strategy
used to evaluate the opponent’s offer is the same as
the one described in the basic strategy.
4.2.1. Bayesian Learning
Bayesian learning is a probabilistic learning
method based on Bayes’ theorem (Russell and
Norvig, 2003). Given a certain set of hypothesis
H and some observation e, Bayesian learning at-
tempts to compute the probability p(h|e) that a
certain hypothesis h is true after observing e. In our
case, we want to determine whether or not the pro-
posed offer will be acceptable for the opponent (or
the team) (H={acc,¬acc}) given a certain unpre-
dictable partial offer (e = X
′t) where acc stands for
“acceptable” and ¬acc stands for “unacceptable”.
Since we assume that there is no interdependence
among negotiation issues, we can consider that each
negotiation issue contributes individually to the ac-
ceptability of an offer/unpredictable partial offer.
Thus, applying Bayes’ theorem under independence
assumption we have:
p(acc|X ′t) =
p(acc)
∏
j∈UN
p(xj |acc)∑
H∈{acc,¬acc}
p(H)
∏
j∈UN
p(xj |H) (10)
where p(acc) is the prior probability for an unpre-
dictable partial offer to be acceptable, p(¬acc) is
the prior probability for an unpredictable partial of-
fer to be non-acceptable, and p(xj |acc) is the condi-
tional probability that assuming X
′t as acceptable,
it has the value of the j issues instantiated to xj .
We consider positive examples Sacc as those ex-
amples that correspond to the acceptable hypothe-
sis (acc) and negative examples S¬acc as those ex-
amples that correspond to the not acceptable hy-
pothesis (¬acc). For the opponent’s model, we em-
ploy unpredictable partial offers that have appeared
15
in opponent’s offers as positive examples, and un-
predictable partial offers that appear in offers re-
jected by the opponent as negative samples. For
the team’s model, we use FA and those opponent’s
offers rejected by team members as the set of neg-
ative examples. Winners in the Borda votings (i.e.,
unpredictable partial offers contained in offers sent
to the opponent) are considered as positive exam-
ples. For computing p(xj |h), we use the proportion
between the number of times that xj appears in
hypothesis h (acc or ¬acc) and the total number of
examples for h:
p(xj |h) = #{xj ∈ Sh}|Sh| (11)
The reasons for employing Bayesian learning are
varied. The most important one is that it allows
online updating of the model as new samples be-
come available. This is important in a process
like negotiation, where at each interaction new in-
formation becomes available regarding the oppo-
nent’s/teammates’ preferences. If a computation-
ally expensive learning mechanism was used, it
would not be possible to include the new informa-
tion in the model as it becomes available. Further-
more, the learning mechanism is computationally
cheap since it mainly involves counting. This is
also important in a real application since it allows
for simultaneous negotiation threads to exist, which
should be maintained with different opponents to
look for the best alternatives in an electronic mar-
ketplace.
4.2.2. Offer Proposal
Bayesian models are employed to help in the se-
lection of the unpredictable partial offer that is pro-
posed to the other team members. Bayesian team
members propose at t unpredictable partial offers
in the set defined in Equation 7. Bayesian models
help to select a candidate from that set.
However, it is reasonable to think that in the first
interactions Bayesian model do not accurately rep-
resent other agents’ preferences. For that purpose,
a team member invests part of the negotiation time
texp in exploring the negotiation space and collect-
ing information regarding the opponent’s and the
team’s preferences. As long as the negotiation pro-
cess has not surpassed texp, the team member just
selects randomly one of candidate unpredictable
partial offers as basic team members do. Mean-
while, the Bayesian models are continuously up-
dated with the new information that becomes avail-
able during the negotiation. After reaching the time
threshold, the team member starts to use Bayesian
models in order to select the unpredictable partial
offer to be proposed to the mediator during the offer
proposal phase. The heuristic used in the selection
of the candidate is proposing an unpredictable par-
tial offer that is both acceptable for the team and
the opponent. The model has an additional pa-
rameter named pesc. It represents the probability
of avoiding the Bayesian proposal model and using
the random proposal model as described in the ba-
sic team member model when the negotiation time
has gone beyond texp. This parameter is included
in the model in order to: (i) further explore the
negotiation space; (ii) escape from local optima in-
duced by inaccurate Bayesian models (e.g., wrong
samples, limited number of samples, etc.). We can
formalize the selection as follows:
X
′t
a =
 argmaxX∈B
∑
wbpb(acc|X)
b∈{A,op}
if
 rand ≤ pesc∧
t ≥ texp
random partial offer(B) otherwise
(12)
where B is the set of candidate unpredictable par-
tial offers that fulfill Equation 7, rand is a random
number, pA(acc|X) is the probability for a candi-
date unpredictable partial offer to be acceptable
for the team, popp(acc|X) is the probability for the
candidate unpredictable partial offer to be accept-
able for the opponent, and wA and wop
1 represent
the weights given to the acceptability of the un-
predictable partial offer for the team and the op-
ponent, respectively (i.e., we will refer to them as
Bayesian weights). Varying these Bayesian weights
allow team members to show different behaviors de-
pending on their inclination to satisfy either the
team or the opponent with the unpredictable par-
tial offer.
5. Provably Unanimously Acceptable Deci-
sions
As stated in the introduction, one of our re-
search goals is proposing a negotiation team model
that is able to guarantee unanimously acceptable
team decisions. Next, we show that under the as-
1wA + wop = 1.
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sumption of rationality2, team members are able to
achieve unanimously acceptable final agreements, if
an agreement is found. For that matter, let us em-
ploy reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity).
If X is the final agreement, let us suppose that
Equation 2 (unanimously acceptable) is violated in
a negotiation: unanimity is not reached because a
obtained a utility below its reservation utility.
∃a ∈ A,Ua(X ′t) +
∑
j∈PR
wa,jVa,j(xj) < RUa (13)
The final agreement is found when (1) team mem-
bers accept an opponent’s offer or (2) the opponent
accepts a team’s offer. Next, we show that in both
cases, Equation 13 is never true.
1. When the team members accept an opponent’s
offer, a unanimity voting process has been car-
ried to decide whether or not to accept the final
offer. The offer is only accepted if all of the
team members have emitted a positive vote.
Since a rational agent a would never have in-
centive to emit a positive vote of the offer re-
ported a utility below its reservation utility,
this scenario is never true due to the intra-team
mechanism.
2. When the opponent accepts a team’s offer X,
this offer has been necessarily proposed by
the intra-team mechanism mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.2.2. The offer can be decomposed into
an unpredictable partial offer X
′t and the in-
stantiation of predictable issues. The team
member a is not able to get over its reserva-
tion utility if and only if X
′t ∈ Fa or when
X
′t /∈ Fa and a could not get what it de-
manded in predictable issues. A rational agent
has no incentive to exclude a forbidden unpre-
dictable partial offer X
′t when declaring Fa.
Since FA =
⋃
a∈A
Fa and the mediator ignores
unpredictable partial offers in FA, an unpre-
dictable partial offer X
′t that forms a team
offer is never in Fa. If X
′t /∈ Fa then the
agent can accomplish to satisfy the following
expression Ua(X
′t) +maxPRa ≥ RUa. Agent
a could not get over its reservation value be-
cause he could not demand the most of pre-
dictable issues. However, when the team me-
diator aggregates predictable issues inside the
2Rational agents seek to improve their current welfare.
Thus, they would not take actions that lead to utilities below
their reservation utilities.
team, the team mediator selects the highest
value for team members in the list of values
proposed by them. This makes possible for a to
obtain the maximum utility from predictable
issues. Hence, Equation 13 never holds if the
negotiation ends with agreement.
Since both possible scenarios are never true un-
der our initial assumption, we have shown by re-
duction ad absurdum that, if a final agreement is
found, it is unanimously acceptable among team
members. Another issue is the presence of exagger-
ating agents (i.e., agents that exaggerate to get the
most from the negotiation). In our setting, even if
team members exaggerate and decide to include in
Fa unpredictable partial offers that are acceptable
but report low utility, or demand more than they
need from predictable issues, if a final agreement is
found it will be unanimous among team members.
However, by doing so, they may be pruning negoti-
ation space and lowering the probability of finding
agreements. This is an interesting situation that we
plan to study in the future.
6. Experiments
In this section, we explore the behavior of the
proposed negotiation model in different scenar-
ios. The proposed framework has been imple-
mented in genius (Lin et al., 2012), a simulation
framework for automated negotiation that allows
researchers to test their frameworks and strate-
gies against state-of-the-art agents designed by
other researchers. Recently, genius has become a
widespread tool that increases its repository of ne-
gotiating agents with the annual negotiation com-
petition (Baarslag et al., 2012).
In order to assess the performance of the pro-
posed negotiation approach, we have performed dif-
ferent experiments. All of the experiments have
been carried out in the negotiation domain (or case
study) introduced in Section 2.4. The first exper-
iment (Section 6.1) studies the performance of the
proposed model when facing single opponent agent.
The comparison is carried out in scenarios with dif-
ferent degrees of team’s preference dissimilarity. In
the second experiment, we study the performance
of our negotiation team model when facing another
negotiation team in bilateral negotiations. In the
third experiment (Section 6.3) we study how the
Bayesian weights wA and wop, which control the
importance given to the preferences of the team and
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the opponent in the unpredictable partial offer pro-
posed to teammates, impact the performance of the
proposed model when team members employ the
Bayesian strategy. Finally, we conduct an experi-
ment to study the effect of team members’ reser-
vation utility on the performance of the proposed
negotiation model (Section 6.4).
6.1. Performance Against a Single Opponent
In this first set of experiments we study the per-
formance of the proposed negotiation team model
when facing a single opponent. The study is carried
out with an emphasis on observing if the perfor-
mance of the team is higher by employing Bayesian
team members rather than basic team members.
Due to the fact that we are interested in open en-
vironments, we study how the team performance
varies with team configurations ranging from sce-
narios where no team members plays the Bayesian
strategy (i.e., all Basic team members) to situa-
tions where all the team members play the Bayesian
strategy. The performance of the team is measured
using the average team joint utility3. As an addi-
tional measure of optimality, we also measure the
distance to the closest Pareto optimal point. In this
case, the Pareto frontier is computed taking into ac-
count the team joint utility and the utility of the
opponent. Our initial hypotheses were:
• H1 As more Bayesian team members form the
team, the team is able to obtain average team
joint utilities that are higher than or equal to
those configurations with less Bayesian team
members.
• H2 As more Bayesian team members form the
team, the team is able to obtain average oppo-
nent utilities that are higher than or equal to
those configurations with less Bayesian team
members.
Since Bayesian team members take the prefer-
ences of the team and the opponent into account
when deciding which offer is sent to the other part,
they should be able guarantee equal or higher av-
erage team joint utility and opponent utility than
basic team members. But in no case, they should
3We consider the joint utility of the team to be the prod-
uct of the utilities of the team members. Since the utility of
an agent is between 0 and 1, the team joint utility tends to
be lower as more team members are present.
not obtain lower team joint utility and opponent
utility. As a consequence of both hypothesis, the
distance to the closest Pareto optimal point should
be also equal or lower than that obtained by config-
urations solely composed by basic team members.
In order to compare the proposed model with
other models in the literature, we also included
the Similarity Borda Voting model (i.e., SBV)
(Sanchez-Anguix et al., 2011) in our experiment.
SBV is a mediated intra-team strategy that is able
to guarantee semi-unanimity regarding team deci-
sions. The mediator imposes a unanimity voting
process to decide on whether or not to accept the
opponent’s offer, whilst team members propose of-
fers to be sent to the opponent by means of a simi-
larity heuristic that takes into account the last offer
proposed by the opponent, and the last offer pro-
posed by the team. A Borda voting process is used
in order to decide on which offer is sent to the oppo-
nent. The reason to include this intra-team strat-
egy in our study is due to the fact that it has been
documented to achieve similar results to intra-team
strategies that guarantee unanimity under certain
circumstances for domains solely composed by pre-
dictable issues (Sanchez-Anguix et al., 2011). In
order to adapt this approach for domains with un-
predictable issues, we use a similarity heuristic that
uses Euclidean distance for real/integer issues and
string matching for other types of issues. Due to
the fact that our proposed model guarantees unan-
imously acceptable agreements and SBV does not,
we formulated the following hypothesis:
• H3 Teams exclusively formed by basic team
members and teams exclusively formed by
Bayesian team members obtain equal or higher
average team joint utility than teams following
the Similarity Borda Voting model.
The performance of this first experiment is an-
alyzed in three scenarios with different degrees of
preference dissimilarity among team members: very
similar, average similarity, and very dissimilar pref-
erences. For this reason, we introduce a measure
for measuring team members’ preference similar-
ity in different scenarios. The authors proposed a
method for calculating preference dissimilarity in
teams based on the utility difference of offers among
teammates (Sanchez-Anguix et al., 2011). The dis-
similarity between two teammates a, b ∈ A can be
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measured as:
D(Ua(.), Ub(.)) =
∑
∀X
|Ua(X)− Ub(X)|
# possible offers
(14)
Due to the fact that a team may be composed
of more than two members, it is necessary to pro-
vide a team dissimilarity measure. The team dis-
similarity measure is calculated as the average of
the dissimilarity between all of the possible pairs of
teammates. For this experiment, we decided to ex-
plore teams whose preferences are dissimilar, teams
whose preferences are similar, and teams with an
average degree of similarity/dissimilarity (i.e., aver-
age similarity). For the scenario of dissimilar prefer-
ences, 9 negotiation cases were randomly generated
(i.e., a combination of 3 different negotiation teams
consisting of four team members with 3 different op-
ponents), while 9 negotiation cases were randomly
generated for the similar preferences scenario (i.e.,
a combination of 3 different negotiation teams con-
sisting of four team members with 3 different op-
ponents) and 12 negotiation cases were randomly
generated for the average similarity scenario (i.e.,
a combination of 4 different negotiation teams con-
sisting of four team members with 3 different op-
ponents). Since we consider that in practice it is
less likely to meet extreme cases such as dissimilar
or similar teams, we decided to increase the num-
ber of negotiation cases in the average similarity
scenario.
As for the single opponents, we decided to test
the negotiation team models against different fami-
lies of opponents. More specifically, we followed the
categorization of negotiation strategies proposed by
Baarslag et al. (Baarslag et al., 2011), which di-
vides negotiation strategies into four categories:
• Competitors: They hardly concede, indepen-
dently of opponent behavior. Agent K is
a competitor agent (Kawaguchi et al., 2011;
Baarslag et al., 2011) from the 2010 ANAC
competition(Baarslag et al., 2012) that adjusts
its aspirations (i.e., target utility) in the nego-
tiation process considering to an estimation of
the maximum utility that will be offered by the
other party. More specifically, the agent grad-
ually reduces its target utility based on the av-
erage utility offered by the opponent and its
standard deviation.
• Matchers: They concede when they perceive
that the opponent concedes, and they do not
concede if they perceive that the other party
does concede. Nice Tit-for-Tat is a matcher
agent (Baarslag et al., 2011, 2013) from the
2011 ANAC competition that reciprocates the
other party’s moves by means of a Bayesian
model of the other party’s preferences. Accord-
ing to the Bayesian model, the Nice Tit-for-Tat
agent attempts to calculate the Nash point and
it reciprocates moves by calculating the dis-
tance of the last opponent offer to the afore-
mentioned point. When the negotiation time
is reaching its deadline, the Nice TFT agent
will wait for an offer that is not expected to
improve in the remaining time and accept it in
order to secure an agreement.
• Conceders: They yield independently of the
opponent behavior. Conceder is an imple-
mentation of the time-based concession tactics
proposed by Faratin et al. (Faratin et al., 1998)
categorized by Baarslag et al. as conceder. For
the Conceder agent βop = 2, which leads to
large concessions towards the reservation util-
ity in the first rounds.
• Inverter: They respond by implementing the
opposite behavior shown by the other party.
Boulware is an implementation of the time-
based concession tactics proposed by Faratin
et al. (Faratin et al., 1998) categorized by
Baarslag et al. as inverter. In the case of
the Boulware agent, the concession speed is set
to βop = 0.2. Hence, the agent concedes very
insignificantly during most of the negotiation
and it concedes very quickly as the deadline
approaches.
The reservation utility of each team member was
set to RUa = 0.5 to represent scenarios where team
members have average aspirations. Additionally,
for each team member (i.e., basic, Bayesian and
SBV) the concession speed was randomly selected
from a uniform distribution βa = U [0.5, 1]. In
the case of Bayesian members, the time of explo-
ration was set to texp = 70% and the probability
of escape after the exploration phase was set to
pesc = 30%
4. Therefore, Bayesian models are not
used unless a 70% of the negotiation time (126 sec-
onds) has passed. Initially, we set Bayesian mem-
4These values were found to be the best ones after carry-
ing out a grid search over values of texp and pesc in a subset
of test negotiation scenarios
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Similar
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Boulware Conceder
T. Op. D. T. Op. D. T. Op. D. T. Op. D
SBV 0.181 0.743 0.070 0.150 0.694 0.130 0.184 0.755 0.064 0.552 0.482 0.037
Basic 0.259 0.683 0.065 0.173 0.760 0.067 0.223 0.696 0.078 0.561 0.468 0.045
Bayesian 0.263 0.690 0.058 0.164 0.746 0.080 0.224 0.695 0.080 0.557 0.472 0.043
Average Similarity
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Boulware Conceder
T. J Op. D. T. J Op. D. T. J Op. D. T. J Op. D.
SBV 0.168 0.629 0.065 0.137 0.562 0.116 0.170 0.598 0.070 0.324 0.428 0.074
Basic 0.211 0.574 0.070 0.141 0.691 0.050 0.210 0.585 0.060 0.386 0.414 0.052
Bayesian 0.248 0.583 0.034 0.158 0.669 0.047 0.224 0.574 0.045 0.390 0.414 0.050
Dissimilar
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Boulware Conceder
T. J Op. D. T. J Op. D. T. J Op. D. T. J Op. D.
SBV 0.07 0.522 0.168 0.160 0.457 0.157 0.128 0.547 0.110 0.257 0.430 0.110
Basic 0.174 0.397 0.180 0.184 0.572 0.055 0.254 0.505 0.053 0.472 0.367 0.046
Bayesian 0.209 0.457 0.118 0.196 0.559 0.60 0.271 0.489 0.058 0.475 0.367 0.044
Table 1: Average team joint utility (T. ), the average opponent utility (Op.), and the average Euclidean distance to the closest
Pareto optimal point (D.) for the first set of experiments.
bers to care equally about the acceptability of un-
predictable partial for the team and the opponent
wA = wop = 0.5.
Following the type of setting used in the annual
agent competition, the negotiation time was set to
T = 180 seconds. Each opponent strategy was
faced against each negotiation team model in ev-
ery possible negotiation case. A total of 20 repe-
titions were done per negotiation case in order to
capture stochastic variations in negotiation strate-
gies. Therefore, 3 × 3 × 3 × 4 × 20 = 2160 (team
preference profiles × opponent preference profiles ×
team negotiation models × opponent strategies ×
repetitions) negotiations were simulated in the sim-
ilar scenario, 2160 negotiations were simulated in
the dissimilar scenario, and 2880 negotiations were
simulated in the average similarity scenario.
Table 1 shows the average team joint utility
and opponent utility for the cases where all of the
team members either play the Basic strategy, the
Bayesian model, or the team employs the SBV team
negotiation model. It also shows the Euclidean dis-
tance to the closest point in the Pareto frontier. An
ANOVA test (α = 0.05) with a Bonferroni post-
hoc analysis was carried out to assess statistical
differences among the different measures gathered.
Those measures that are statistically the best con-
figurations for each column are highlighted in bold
style. All of the claims in this experimental sec-
tion are supported by the ANOVA test with the
Bonferroni post-hoc analysis. The average negotia-
tion time taken by each method is included in Ta-
ble 2. Figure 7 shows the evolution of the average
team joint utility and the average opponent utility
as more team members play the Bayesian strategy.
We have also included some examples of agreements
obtained in the different negotiation scenarios and
how they relate to the Pareto frontier5. These re-
sults can be observed in Figure 6. Next, we analyze
the results.
6.1.1. Results for the first hypothesis
• H1 As more Bayesian team members form the
team, the team is able to obtain average team
joint utilities that are higher than or equal to
those configurations with less Bayesian team
members.
First, we focus on the situations when all of the
team members either play the basic strategy or the
Bayesian strategy (Tables 1 and 2). It can be ob-
served that when team members’ preferences are
similar, both types of teams perform equally in
terms of the average team joint utility. This result
is consistent with H1, since both prove to be statis-
tically equivalent with the ANOVA test with Bon-
ferroni post-hoc analysis. The reason why Bayesian
5The quadratic root of the team joint utility is taken to
convert the results to the same scale (remember that the
team joint utility is the product of for team members’ utili-
ties)
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Figure 6: Examples of agreements and their distance to the Pareto frontier
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models do not give an advantage over the basic
model in the similar scenario can be explained since
team members are similar and there is no neces-
sity to carry out team modeling. The distance to
the closest Pareto optimal point is also very simi-
lar for both team configurations, which can be also
explained due to the fact that team modeling is
not necessary due to team members’ similar prefer-
ences.
As conflict is introduced inside the team by mak-
ing team members’ preferences more dissimilar (i.e.,
dissimilar and average similarity scenarios, middle
and bottom part of Table 1), it can be observed that
usually the team formed exclusively by Bayesian
team members gets the statistically highest average
team joint utility, which is also coherent with our
hypothesis H1 and refines our hypothesis for these
scenarios. In this case, the teammates’ preferences
are no longer similar and some sort of modeling
mechanism is needed in order to guide the intra-
team negotiation towards agreements that are good
for all of the team members. The only exception is
found in the conceder case, where the performance
in terms of the team joint utility was found to be
statistically equivalent among the team exclusively
formed by basic team members and the team ex-
clusively formed by Bayesian members. Taking a
closer look at the negotiation traces, we observed
that, in all of the negotiations, the exploration time
texp was never surpassed. Since the Conceder agent
concedes rapidly in the negotiation, the team’s de-
mands are also met early. Therefore, Bayesian mod-
els do not get to be used. In fact, the average nego-
tiation time against Conceder agents was 61.7, 76.3,
and 88 seconds respectively in the similar scenario
(see Table 2), the average similarity scenario (see
Table 2), and the dissimilar scenario (see Table 2).
All of them are below the threshold of 126 seconds
delimited by texp. As a result, the team members
have not used their Bayesian model while generat-
ing their proposals and they are equivalent to the
team formed by basic members. This is also con-
sistent with H1, since in no case the team formed
by Bayesian members gets statistically lower results
than the team formed by basic members.
If we observe the evolution of the average team
joint utility in Figure 7 6, there is a tendency
to increase the average team joint utility as more
Bayesian members are included (triangle shaped
6Results for the Conceder agent are omitted since the
Bayesian models are not employed.
Similar
K N. TFT B. C.
SBV 148.7 164.3 139.4 61.0
Basic 141.5 162.5 145.4 62.8
Bayesian 142.3 165.2 144.0 61.7
Average Similarity
K N. TFT B. C.
SBV 155.1 177.6 153.1 74.1
Basic 153.1 174.8 154.9 77.4
Bayesian 150.1 175.0 154.7 76.3
Dissimilar
K N. TFT B. C.
SBV 163.8 175.7 156.6 73.4
Basic 162.2 176.6 160.1 87.7
Bayesian 163.7 177.2 160.5 88.0
Table 2: Average time (seconds) for negotiations in the first
set of experiments. K (Agent K), N. TFT (Nice Tit-for-Tat),
B. (Boulware), C. (Conceder)
data series on Figure 7) in situations where team
members’ preferences have an average similarity or
they are very dissimilar. This tendency is more
pronounced against Agent K (left plot in Figure
7) and Boulware agents (right plot in Figure 7).
However, when team members’ preferences are very
similar the team performance remains at statisti-
cally equivalent values (ANOVA test with Bonfer-
roni analysis) for the average team joint utility. The
results of these graphics are coherent with our find-
ings in Table 1 and H1.
In conclusion, we have found that as more
Bayesian team members form the team, the team is
able to obtain average team joint utilities that are
higher than or equal to those configurations with
less Bayesian team members. Being more specific,
we have been able to detect that, as long as there
is preferential conflict among team members (i.e.,
average similarity among team members, and very
dissimilar team members), and the opponent does
not concede early in the negotiation, more Bayesian
team members result in higher team joint utility.
6.1.2. Results for the second hypothesis
• H2 As more Bayesian team members form the
team, the team is able to obtain average oppo-
nent utilities that are higher than or equal to
those configurations with less Bayesian team
members.
For the average opponent utility, the Bayesian
team obtained significantly better results than the
basic team only in the scenario where the team faces
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Figure 7: Evolution of the average team joint utility and opponent utility as more Bayesian team members are introduced in
the team.
Agent K and team members are dissimilar with
regards to their preferences (see Table 1, bottom
part). The same pattern is found in Figure 7, where
we can observe that the average opponent utility in-
creases as more Bayesian team members are present
in the team (first plot in the second row of Figure
7). In other cases, the Bayesian and the basic team
obtain statistically equivalent results to each other,
and, in some situations, the basic team obtained
significantly better results. More specifically, when
the team faces Nice Tit-for-Tat, the basic team ob-
tains significantly better results than the Bayesian
team. We can also observe this pattern in Figure
7. As more Bayesian members are introduced, the
average opponent utility slightly decreases (middle
plot in the second row of Figure 7).
These findings only support partially our hypoth-
esis H2 since we found a set of scenarios where the
basic team provides better utility to the opponent
(i.e., when facing Nice Tit-for-Tat). We analyzed
the trace of different negotiations against Nice Tit-
for-Tat and Boulware opponents. In the former
case, we could observe that close to the end of
the negotiation the Nice Tit-for-Tat opponent had
only sent on average 5 different unpredictable par-
tial offers in a domain that has 4200 different un-
predictable partial offers. This behavior results in
scarce information for any learning mechanism. In
the case of negotiations against Boulware agents,
one should consider that the Boulware strategies
concede only towards the end of the negotiation
and, most of the time, the aspirations are high.
Thus, most of the samples gathered by the Bayesian
classifier when facing Boulware agents correspond
to offers with high demands where usually only the
best issue values appear. Other issue values do not
appear in the samples or they have their frequency
misinterpreted with respect to the utility that they
actually report. Therefore, the learning mechanism
misinterprets the preferences of the opponent and
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the team formed by Bayesian members is not able
to obtain statistically better utility for the oppo-
nent than the team formed by basic members.
The behavior of Nice Tit-for-Tat and Boulware
opponents also has a direct consequence on the dis-
tance to the closest Pareto optimal point obtained
by both team configurations (Bayesian and basic).
Despite the fact that the Bayesian configuration is
capable of obtaining statistically better results for
the team joint utility by learning the preferences
of the team, the utility reported to the opponent
is usually lower than the one reported by the ba-
sic configuration. The only exception to this case
are scenarios against Agent K, where the Bayesian
configuration obtains a statistically higher utility
for the opponent. The inability to model the oppo-
nents’ preferences in the case of the Boulware and
Nice Tit-for-Tat opponents, results in a higher team
joint utility (due to team modeling) at the cost
of reducing the utility received by the opponent.
Hence, there is not an improvement in the distance
to the closest Pareto optimal point. These find-
ings can also be observed in some of the examples
included in Figure 6.The agreements found by the
basic team configuration and the Bayesian configu-
ration tend to be found at the same distance to the
Pareto frontier (the Bayesian configuration tending
to populate regions with higher team joint utility).
The exception to this rule are negotiations against
Agent K, where the basic configuration tends to
populate regions of no agreement (close to the axis
origin).
6.1.3. Results for the third hypothesis
• H3 Teams exclusively formed by basic team
members and teams exclusively formed by
Bayesian team members obtain equal or higher
average team joint utility than teams following
the Similarity Borda Voting model.
It can be observed that when team members’ pref-
erences are similar (top part of Table 1), both basic
and Bayesian models are statistically equivalent to
each other and better than SBV with respect to the
average team joint utility. As conflict is introduced
inside the team by making team members’ prefer-
ences more dissimilar (i.e., dissimilar and average
similarity scenarios, middle and bottom part of Ta-
ble 1), the team get statistically lower average team
joint utility by employing the SBV model. Basic
and Bayesian models outperform SBV with respect
to the average team joint utility since they are able
to guarantee unanimously acceptable agreements,
while SBV does not guarantee such condition. This
result supports and refines our hypothesis H3, since,
in general, the team formed exclusively by Bayesian
team members and the team formed by basic team
members obtains statistically higher team joint util-
ities than the SBV model. There is only one ex-
ception to this refinement. The basic team, the
Bayesian team and SBV perform statistically equal
in terms of the average team joint utility only when
the opponent is a conceder and team members’ pref-
erences are similar. Since the opponent concedes
rapidly in the first rounds, the three models ob-
tain equivalent team joint utility due to the oppo-
nent concessions and the fact that conflict is almost
nonexistent among team members. However, this
finding is still consistent with our initial guess H3.
Regarding the optimality of the solutions found
by the model proposed in this article with respect
to SBV, it is possible to observe that both Bayesian
and basic configurations obtains statistically lower
distance to the Pareto frontier than SBV as long
as preferential conflict between team members is
present (i.e., average similarity and dissimilar sce-
narios). Only when the team is very similar, SBV
gets statistically equal distances to the model pro-
posed in this article. However, despite the fact that
the distance to the Pareto frontier may be statisti-
cally equal, we can observe in Figure 6 that agree-
ments found by SBV tend to populate areas that
are closer to the lowest team joint utility. This re-
sult can be explained due to the fact that unanimity
cannot be guaranteed in the team, and some team
members end up with low utility agreements.
In conclusion, we found that teams exclusively
formed by basic team members and teams exclu-
sively formed by Bayesian team members obtain
equal or higher average team joint utility than
teams following the Similarity Borda Voting model.
More specifically, we found that, in general, the re-
sults for the team formed by Bayesian team mem-
bers and the team formed by basic team members
obtains statistically higher results than the SBV
model. The distance to the Pareto frontier also
shows higher quality and more optimal agreements
for teams employing the model proposed in this
article. This result is important, since it shows
that the present model, not only guarantees unan-
imously acceptable agreements, but it also ensures
that better results are obtained with respect to
other state-of-the-art team negotiation models.
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6.2. Performance Against Another Team
In this experiment we analyze the performance
of the proposed model when two teams face each
other. More specifically, we simulate negotiations
where one negotiation team represents a group of
four travelers, and the other negotiation team rep-
resents the board of managers for a hotel, which
consists also of four managers. The negotiation has
a common deadline of T = 180 seconds. Both par-
ties negotiate with each other by means of the al-
ternating bilateral protocol, but they employ the
negotiation team model proposed in this article to
coordinate and take team decisions. The goal of the
experiment is determining if Bayesian team mem-
ber improve the performance of the team when it
faces another team.
In this setting, we use 4 different team prefer-
ence profiles to represent the group of travelers and
2 different team preference profiles to represent the
board of managers. Since we are interested in open
environments, we consider different team configura-
tions from the perspective of strategy profiles: No
team member plays the Bayesian strategy (0-0),half
of the team members play the Bayesian strategy
in one team (2-0), all of the team members play
the Bayesian strategy in one team (4-0), half of the
team members are Bayesian in both teams (2-2), all
of the team members are Bayesian in one team and
half of them are Bayesian in the other team (4-2),
and all of the team members are Bayesian (4-4).
For each strategy profile, each group of travelers’ is
faced against each board of managers 20 times to
capture stochastic variations. Therefore, a total of
4×2×20 = 160 negotiations is carried out per team
strategy profile, giving a total of 960 negotiations
for this experiment.
Our initial guess is that more Bayesian team
members will help to obtain higher team joint util-
ities due to the learning and proposal mechanism
used to take into account the preferences of the
team and the preferences of the opponent. More
specifically, we formulated the following hypothe-
ses:
• H4 As long as only one team includes Bayesian
team members (configurations 2-0 and 4-0),
the average team joint utility for both teams
will be higher than the average team joint util-
ity obtained by negotiations where no Bayesian
team member participates (configuration 0-0).
• H5 Those configurations where both teams in-
clude Bayesian team members (configurations
2-2, 4-2, and 4-4) will obtain higher aver-
age team joint utilities for both teams than
configurations where only one team includes
Bayesian team members (configurations 2-0
and 4-0).
We configure the parameters as we did in our
previous experiment. The results of the experiment
can be observed in Figure 8. The blue points repre-
sent the average team joint utility for the group of
travelers, whereas the red points represent the av-
erage team joint utility for the board of managers.
The graphic shows an increasing average team joint
utility as the total of Bayesian team members in
both sides increases. The worst results for both
teams are obtained when all of the team members
act as the basic team member (0-0). This result
is explainable due to the large number of negoti-
ations that finished with no agreement (80 out of
160 negotiations, a 50% of failure). As long as one
of the sides implements the Bayesian strategy (2-0,
4-0), both teams benefit by obtaining higher av-
erage team joint utilities. An ANOVA test with
Bonferroni post-hoc analysis (α = 0.05) confirmed
that both configurations 2-0 and 4-0 obtain statis-
tically different and higher team joint utilities for
both teams than the configuration 0-0. This result
confirmed our initial hypothesis H4.
It can be observed that the next relevant increase
in the average team joint utility of both teams is
present as long as both sides apply the Bayesian
strategy (2-2, 4-2, 4-4). An ANOVA test with Bon-
ferroni post-hoc analysis (α = 0.05) revealed that
the averages obtained by configurations 2-2, 4-2,
and 4-4 are statistically different and higher than
the averages obtained by 2-0 and 4-0. Hence, both
teams obtain higher average team joint utilities as
long as both teams include Bayesian team members,
supporting our hypothesis H5.
In conclusion, we have been able to determine
that when two teams face each other by means of
the proposed model, both teams benefit by obtain-
ing higher team joint utilities when Bayesian team
members participate in the negotiation. This is
especially true when Bayesian team members are
distributed between both teams, which obtains the
highest team joint utilities for both sides.
6.3. Analyzing the impact of Bayesian weights for
the proposal of unpredictable partial offers
Recalling from Section 4.2, there are two weight
parameters that control how important the op-
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Figure 8: Evolution of the average team joint utility with the
different strategy profiles (Blue= group of travelers, Red=
board of managers).
ponent’s and team’s preferences are while gener-
ating the unpredictable partial offer (respectively
wop, wA). wA represents how important it is for
the team members to make an unpredictable par-
tial offer that is acceptable for the team, whereas
wop represents how important it is for us to make
an unpredictable partial offer that is acceptable for
the opponent. The use of these weights is not triv-
ial, since one should consider that, it only refers
to the acceptability of the unpredictable partial of-
fer by one of the two parties. A complete offer is
composed by the predictable and unpredictable is-
sues. Therefore, for instance, using a high value of
wop may not have the desired effect on the oppo-
nent unless unpredictable issues are important for
the opponent. Additionally, one should also con-
sider that the more acceptable an unpredictable is
for the team/opponent, the more utility it should
report.
In this experiment we explore the impact of these
weights in a wide variety of situations. More specif-
ically, we study how different values for wop and wA
affect situations where the team gives more impor-
tance to unpredictable issues than the opponent,
situations where the opponent gives more impor-
tance to unpredictable issues than the team, and
situations where both team and the opponent give
the same importance to unpredictable issues.
To assess the importance given by an agent to
unpredictable partial issues, we consider the sum of
unpredictable issue weights in its utility function.
Ia =
∑
j∈UN
wi,j (15)
We consider that when Ia ∈ [0.0, 0.33] the agent a
gives low importance to unpredictable issues, when
Ia ∈ [0.33, 0.66] it gives average importance to
unpredictable issues, and when Ia ∈ [0.66, 1.0] the
agent gives high importance to unpredictable issues.
We generated 8 random negotiation cases where
team members give a high importance to unpre-
dictable issues and the opponent gives low (4 cases)
and average (4 cases) importance to unpredictable
issues, 8 different randomly generated negotiation
cases where team members give a low importance
to unpredictable issues and the opponent gives av-
erage (4 cases) and high (4 cases) importance to un-
predictable issues, and 12 negotiation cases where
the opponent and the team give the same impor-
tance to unpredictable issues (4 cases where both
give low importance, 4 cases where both give aver-
age importance, and 4 cases where both give high
importance).
We tested three configurations for Bayesian
teams: standard Bayesian members that give the
same importance to the acceptability of the un-
predictable partial offer by the opponent and the
team wA = wop = 0.5 (Normal), Bayesian mem-
bers that give more importance to the acceptabil-
ity of the unpredictable partial offer by the oppo-
nent wA = 0.25 wop = 0.75 (Opponent Oriented),
and Bayesian members that give more importance
to the acceptability of the unpredictable partial of-
fer by the team wA = 0.75 wop = 0.25 (Team
Oriented). As for the opponent’s strategies, we se-
lected Agent K, Nice TFT and Boulware.
In situations where the opponent gives more im-
portance to unpredictable issues than the team, the
team should be able to obtain higher average team
joint utility by playing high values for wop, satisfy-
ing opponent needs with unpredictable issues, and
demanding more on predictable issues. If the team
gives more importance to unpredictable issues, the
team should be able to obtain higher average team
joint utility by playing high values for wA, satis-
fying opponent needs with predictable issues, and
demanding more on unpredictable issues. If both
teams give the same importance to unpredictable
issues, the team should be able to guarantee higher
average team joint utility by giving the same weight
to wop and wA since no party gives more importance
to unpredictable issues. Attending to these initial
guesses, we formulated the following hypotheses:
• H6 When the opponent gives more impor-
tance to unpredictable issues, the team obtains
higher team joint utility by using high values
for wop and demanding more on predictable is-
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sues (wA = 0.25 wop = 0.75).
• H7 When the team gives more importance to
unpredictable issues, the team obtains higher
team joint utility by using high values for
wA and letting the opponent demand on pre-
dictable issues (wA = 0.75 wop = 0.25).
• H8 When both parties give the same impor-
tance to unpredictable issues, the team obtains
higher team joint utility by giving the same
importance to the opponent’s and team’s pref-
erences on unpredictable issues (wA = wop =
0.5).
For each negotiation case, we repeated the nego-
tiation 20 times in order to capture stochastic vari-
ations in strategies. Therefore, a total of 1680 ne-
gotiations were carried out in this experiment. The
results of this experiment can be observed in Table
3. It shows the average of the joint team utility and
proportion of negotiations that finished with suc-
cess (agreement) in the scenario. An ANOVA test
(α = 0.05) with Bonferroni post-hoc analysis was
carried out to detect statistically different averages.
The best configurations for each of the three sce-
narios are highlighted in bold font style. All of the
claims of this experimental section are supported
with the aforementioned ANOVA test with post-
hoc analysis.
Focusing on the case of negotiations against
Agent K, it can be appreciated that when unpre-
dictable issues are more important for the oppo-
nent (bottom part of Table 3), the best results
are obtained by taking an opponent oriented ap-
proach: proposing unpredictable partial offers that
are likely to be acceptable for the opponent and sat-
isfy remaining members’ aspirations by demanding
on predictable and compatible issues, which are less
important for the opponent. This finding supports
H6. As for the scenario where unpredictable is-
sues are more important for the team (middle part
of Table 3), it is clearly observed that the best
choice for team joint utility is to give a high weight
to wA, thus employing a team oriented approach.
Since unpredictable issues are more important for
the team, they should satisfy their needs as much
as possible with proposed unpredictable partial of-
fers and demand less on predictable issues, which
are more important for the opponent, supporting
our initial hypothesis H7. Finally, the last sce-
nario corresponds to the case where unpredictable
issues have the same importance for both parties
(top part of Table 3). In this case, there may be
more conflict between the team and its opponent
since the parties do not have a clear trade-off op-
portunity such as increasing the demand on unpre-
dictable issue while decreasing the demand on pre-
dictable issues as appeared in two previous cases.
One can observe that the best team joint utility is
obtained when using the standard team members
(wA = wop = 0.5). Since both parties give the same
importance to unpredictable issues, it seems natural
to give the same importance to the acceptability of
the unpredictable partial offer by the team and the
opponent, supporting our hypothesis H8. The team
oriented approach is clearly worse than the rest of
approaches since many negotiations (only a 58.7%
were successful. See top part of Table 3 ) ended in
failure due to the team being too demanding and
not satisfying the opponent’s preferences.
When negotiating against Nice TFT and Boul-
ware, the results are different. It can be appreciated
that, generally, the team oriented approach always
reports statistically better results from the point of
view of the average team joint utility. This means
that the team should indistinctly select highly ac-
ceptable unpredictable partial offers for the team
when facing opponents like Nice TFT and Boul-
ware agents. These findings do not support our
hypotheses H6, H7, and H8, and drove a more in-
depth analysis and study. There are two factors
that should be taken into account. First, as we de-
tected in Section 6.1, the Bayesian models that are
learnt from both agents are not adequate due to
the lack of learning samples detected in the case of
Nice TFT and the misinterpretation of the impor-
tance of issue values in the case of the Boulware
agent. This factor precludes the agents from find-
ing good agreements for both parties when using an
opponent oriented approach in scenarios where un-
predictable issues are more important for the oppo-
nent. Since the Bayesian models misinterpret the
preferences of Boulware and Nice TFT agents, it
is not possible to create win-win situations. Sec-
ond, by selecting a team oriented approach, the
Bayesian team members are selecting the more ac-
ceptable (i.e., the best) unpredictable partial offers
for the team. These unpredictable partial offers re-
port high utility for the team. Thus, once com-
pleted with predictable issues, these offers are ex-
pected to report high utility for the team. Differ-
ently to Agent K, Nice TFT and Boulware agents
are not competitor agents since they will eventu-
ally accept the team’s offer when the deadline is
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approaching. In the case of the Boulware agent, it
concedes quickly with respect to its aspirations as
the deadline approaches, eventually meeting the re-
quirements of the demanding team offer. As stated
in (Baarslag et al., 2013), when the negotiation time
is reaching its deadline, the Nice TFT agent will
wait for an offer that is not expected to improve
in the remaining time in order to secure an agree-
ment. Hence, the team is able to exploit the other
party by selecting the team oriented approach. Due
to these circumstances, hypotheses H6, H7, and H8
were not supported for agents Boulware and Nice
Tit-for-Tat.
In conclusion, hypotheses H6, H7 and H7 are only
partially supported. In general, we have discov-
ered that depending on the type of opponent agent,
the values for weights wop, wA have different effects
on the negotiation. When facing exploitable agents
like Nice TFT and Boulware, the team benefits if
the team members take the team oriented approach,
selecting those unpredictable partial offers that are
more acceptable for the team. If the team faces
competitors like Agent K, the team should match
the values for wop and wA depending on the impor-
tance given by each party to unpredictable issues.
It is acknowledged that, depending on the opponent
and the desired behavior, the team should select dif-
ferent values for the Bayesian proposal weights. A
mechanism for adjusting Bayesian weights based on
the type of opponent is considered as future work.
6.4. Analyzing the Impact of the Reservation Util-
ity
In this experiment, we investigated the impact
of the reservation utility of team members on the
team joint utility. As explained in Section 3.1,
team members jointly prune a part of the negotia-
tion space (i.e., a set of unpredictable partial offers)
which does not contain, with absolute certainty, any
unanimously acceptable offer. This pruning is re-
lated with the reservation utility of team members,
which represents the minimum acceptable utility
by team members. Any offer with a utility lower
than the reservation utility is not acceptable for the
agent.
Lower reservation utilities make it easier to ob-
tain the needed utility by just setting compatible
and predictable issues. Thus, each team member
needs to prune less negotiation space with the un-
predictable partial offers sent to the team media-
tor. Presumably, a joint list of forbidden unpre-
dictable partial offers (i.e., the negotiation space
Similar Avg. Similarity Dissimilar
RUa = 0.35 0.4% 11.6% 35.3%
RUa = 0.50 23.8% 34.2% 72.6%
RUa = 0.65 73.7% 81.8% 90.8%
Table 4: Average percentage of unpredictable partial offers
pruned in the pre-negotiation.
that is pruned) with lower reservation utilities is
smaller than lists constructed with higher reserva-
tion utilities. This leaves more room for finding
an agreement with the opponent. However, if team
members have low reservation utilities, despite hav-
ing more room for finding an agreement, they may
end up with low utility agreements in the end. On
the contrary, with higher reservation utilities, it is
harder to obtain the needed utility with compat-
ible and predictable issues. Therefore, each team
member may need to prune more negotiation space
and the joint list of forbidden unpredictable partial
offers will be larger than the list constructed with
lower reservation utilities. In fact, if team members
set high aspirations with their reservation utility,
it may end up with all the negotiation space be-
ing pruned. If an agreement is found under these
conditions, it may lead to team members achieving
high levels of utility.
In this experiment, we test the impact of different
levels of reservation utility on the team joint utility.
More specifically, as we did in Section 6.1, we tested
teams employing the Bayesian model against dif-
ferent families of strategies: competitor (i.e., Agent
K), matcher (i.e., Nice Tit-for-Tat), inverter (i.e.,
Boulware), and conceder (i.e., conceder). As an ad-
ditional dimension to our study, we also introduced
preference similarity among team members. There-
fore, teams are tested in the scenario where team
members’ preferences are dissimilar, the scenario
where team members’ preferences have an average
degree of similarity, and the scenario where team
members’ preferences are similar.
We configured three types of Bayesian teams with
different levels of reservation utilities: a team with
a relatively low reservation utility RUa = 0.35, a
team with a moderate reservation utility RUa =
0.5, and a team with a high reservation utility
RUa = 0.65. We expect that playing higher reser-
vation utilities against competitor like Agent K will
result in lower average team joint utility due to
many negotiations ending with no agreement. On
the other hand, we expected that playing high reser-
vation utilities against Conceder agents, inverter
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Equal importance on unpredictable issues
vs. Agent K vs. Nice TFT vs. Boulware
T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag.
Normal 0.168 84.2 0.137 100 0.202 100
Opponent Oriented 0.155 91.1 0.126 100 0.188 100
Team Oriented 0.116 58.7 0.188 100 0.206 100
Unpredictable issues more important for the team
vs. Agent K vs. Nice TFT vs. Boulware
T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag.
Normal 0.213 100 0.135 100 0.185 100
Opponent Oriented 0.200 100 0.154 100 0.189 100
Team Oriented 0.248 100 0.196 100 0.213 100
Unpredictable issues more important for the opponent
vs. Agent K vs. Nice TFT vs. Boulware
T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag.
Normal 0.280 100 0.186 100 0.326 100
Opponent Oriented 0.296 100 0.192 100 0.300 100
Team Oriented 0.271 92.0 0.259 100 0.340 100
Table 3: Impact of wA and wop on the average team joint utility in different scenarios and proportion of negotiations that
finished with success (% Ag.).
agents like Boulware, and the special case of Nice
Tit-for-Tat, would result in higher average team
joint utility due to the fact that both agents should
eventually concede towards the other parties’ de-
mands. In the case of Nice Tit-for-Tat, we have
observed that when the deadline is approaching it
attempts to secure a deal, making this agent can-
didate to be exploited by setting a high reservation
utility. Therefore, we formulated the following hy-
potheses:
• H9 Playing a high reservation value for team
members (RUa = 0.65) will result in the lowest
average team joint utility against Agent K.
• H10 Playing a high reservation value for team
members (RUa = 0.65) will result in the high-
est average team joint utility against Conceder,
Boulware, and Nice Tit-for-Tat.
These types of teams (RUa = 0.35, RUa =
0.5, RUa = 0.65) were faced in every scenario and
negotiation case against every type of opponent for
20 repetitions. We gathered information on the
team joint utility and the utility obtained by the
opponent, and an ANOVA (α = 0.05) with Bonfer-
roni post-hoc analysis was carried out to determine
results that are statistically better than the rest.
All of the claims of this experimental section are
supported by the ANOVA test with the Bonferroni
post-hoc analysis.
Table 5 shows the results of this experiment in
terms of the average joint utility. A bold font style
is used to highlight those Bayesian team configura-
tions that are statistically the best option against
each opponent. Additionally, the same table shows
the proportion of negotiations that finished with
success (agreement) in this experiment. Table 4
shows the average percentage of unpredictable par-
tial offers that were pruned in the pre-negotiation
depending on the team configuration and team pref-
erence similarity.
With respect to H10, it can be observed that in-
dependently of the degree of dissimilarity among
team members’ preferences, team members ob-
tained statistically better team joint utility by set-
ting high reservation utilities (RUa = 0.65) against
Boulware, Conceder, and Nice Tit-for-Tat oppo-
nents. These results support our initial hypothesis
H10.
Nevertheless, H9 is only partially supported.
When facing Agent K, playing the highest reserva-
tion utility configuration lead to the highest team
joint utilities when team members’ preferences are
similar or they have an average similarity (top and
middle part of Table 5), which is opposite to our
initial hypothesis H9. In this case, the demands of
the team are still not high enough to preclude agree-
ments with the competitor agent. However, when
team members’ preferences are dissimilar (bottom
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Similar
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Boulware Conceder
T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag.
RUa = 0.35 0.195 100 0.117 100 0.160 100 0.526 100
RUa = 0.50 0.263 100 0.164 100 0.224 100 0.557 100
RUa = 0.65 0.350 99.98 0.286 100 0.354 100 0.635 100
Average Similarity
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Boulware Conceder
T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag.
RUa = 0.35 0.167 100 0.090 100 0.136 100 0.342 100
RUa = 0.50 0.248 100 0.158 100 0.224 100 0.390 100
RUa = 0.65 0.242 74.2 0.268 100 0.313 100 0.470 100
Dissimilar
Agent K Nice Tit-for-Tat Boulware Conceder
T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag. T. Joint % Ag.
RUa = 0.35 0.193 100 0.115 100 0.173 100 0.373 100
RUa = 0.50 0.209 86.6 0.196 100 0.271 100 0.475 100
RUa = 0.65 0.068 18.3 0.346 100 0.409 100 0.580 100
Table 5: Average joint Utility (T. Joint) for teams composed by Bayesian team members with different reservation utilities
and proportion of negotiations that finished with success (% Ag.).
part of Table 5), we can observe how setting a high
reservation utility (i.e., RUa = 0.65) gradually be-
comes the worst possible course of action when fac-
ing Agent K, making H9 true for this situation. The
reason for this behavior is mainly explained due to
the decrease in the number of successful negotia-
tions. If we observe the similar scenario, the num-
ber of successful negotiations when facing Agent K
and RUa = 0.65 is 99.98%. If we change to aver-
age similarity scenarios, the number of successful
negotiations is 74.2% when facing Agent K with
RUa = 0.65. The same measure is decreased to
18.3% in the dissimilar scenario. If we observe Ta-
ble 4, as team dissimilarity increases, the number of
unpredictable partial offers to be pruned is larger.
This leaves less negotiation space to be played with
Agent K. Agent K is a competitor agent that at-
tempts to concede as less as possible by estimat-
ing the maximum utility that can be obtained from
the opponent and employing a limit of compromise
when the opponent takes a hard stance. First of all,
if reservation utilities are high, it can be considered
that team members play a hard stance. Second,
if too much negotiation space is pruned, it may be
feasible that the set of remaining unpredictable par-
tial offers precludes Agent K from reaching its limit
of compromise. Thus, employing high reservation
utilities against a competitor agent like Agent K
may result, as we have observed in this case, in an
increase in the number of failed negotiations and
lower team joint utilities.
In conclusion, H10 is supported by our findings,
but H9 is only partially supported. We have ob-
served that team members may benefit from playing
high reservation utilities against Conceder, Boul-
ware, and Nice Tit-for-Tat. If faced against com-
petitors like Agent K, setting high reservation util-
ities may prune too much negotiation space, espe-
cially when team members are dissimilar. This re-
sults in negotiation spaces that may not contain the
minimum limits established by competitor agents,
thus, ending negotiations with failure. For other
scenarios against agent K, the team can benefit
from setting high reservation utilities since the re-
sulting negotiation space still has room to accom-
modate an agreement with the competitor agent.
In general, team members should be cautious when
setting the reservation utility since it may end up
in more failures.
6.5. Team performance with risk attitudes
One scenario that should be considered in multi-
agent systems is agent’s attitude towards risk.
Some team members may be more willing to choose
actions that guarantee a safer agreement, while
other may prefer to go for more profitable but less
probable agreements. Classically, agents can show
a risk seeking, a risk averse, and a risk neutral at-
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titude. The goal of this experiment is determin-
ing how risk attitudes affect the performance of the
proposed negotiation model. In this experiment, we
decided to test three different patterns of behavior:
• Risk averse team member: This team member
selects from the list of available unpredictable
partial offers (see Equation 7, those that guar-
antee the current aspirations of the team mem-
ber sa(t)) the best unpredictable partial of-
fer according to the acceptance probability for
the opponent by using the Bayesian mecha-
nism proposed in this article. When the team
sets predictable issue, the maximum utility ob-
tainable with other unpredictable partial of-
fers may be higher since they may provide a
higher utility of oneself. However, in order to
secure a deal, the team member selects the un-
predictable partial offer that is supposed to be
more acceptable to the opponent even if the
maximum achievable utility is lower. There-
fore, the team member bases its choices on the
acceptability of the offer by the opponent party
instead of the maximum achievable utility.
• Risk seeking team member: This team member
selects for the list of available unpredictable
partial offers (see Equation 7) the best unpre-
dictable partial offer according to the utility
reported by one’s own utility function. Hence,
this unpredictable partial offer represents the
choice that enables the team member to get
the maximum achievable utility in the negoti-
ation domain. By filling predictable issues by
the team, the team member is more likely to
get closer to its maximum achievable utility,
even if this action reduces acceptability of the
proposed offer for the opponent.
• Risk neutral team member: This behavior is
represented by the Bayesian team member pre-
sented in this article.
Our initial hypothesis is that the proposed model
is robust to risk attitudes. By robustness, we mean
that the proposed negotiation model will be able
to obtain a team joint utility higher than or com-
parable to the team joint utility obtained by other
state-of-the-art models like SBV:
• H11 Different configurations of team mem-
bers’ risk attitudes will yield a team joint util-
ity that is statistically higher or equal to the
results obtained by SBV.
Similar
K N. TFT B. C.
Averse 0.241 0.160 0.238 0.372
Neutral 0.259 0.164 0.224 0.557
Mix 0.250 0.216 0.267 0.520
Seeker 0.169 0.248 0.283 0.615
SBV 0.181 0.150 0.184 0.552
Average Similarity
K N. TFT B. C.
Averse 0.188 0.147 0.186 0.308
Neutral 0.248 0.158 0.224 0.390
Mix 0.231 0.171 0.222 0.383
Seeker 0.149 0.162 0.224 0.477
SBV 0.168 0.137 0.170 0.324
Dissimilar
K N. TFT B. C.
Averse 0.203 0.167 0.245 0.373
Neutral 0.209 0.196 0.271 0.475
Mix 0.228 0.183 0.265 0.452
Seeker 0.060 0.247 0.294 0.566
SBV 0.07 0.16 0.128 0.257
Table 6: Team joint utility obtained by the different team
risk configurations. K (Agent K), N. TFT (Nice Tit-for-Tat),
B. (Boulware), C. (Conceder)
The experimental parameters of the previous
experiments were repeated (RUa = 0.5, βa =
U [0.5, 1]), and we selected four different team con-
figurations. The first one is composed by four neu-
tral team members (Neutral), the second is com-
posed by four risk seeking team members (Seeker),
the third is composed by three risk averse team
members (Averse), and the last team configura-
tion is composed by two neutral team members,
one risk seeker, and one risk averse (Mix). As in
the previous experiments, the team members faced
different opponent profiles in scenarios where team
members’ preference profiles are similar, scenarios
with average similarity of team members’ prefer-
ences, and scenarios where team members have dis-
similar preferences. The team faces the same op-
ponent strategies presented in the previous experi-
ments. We gathered information on the team joint
utility.
The results of this experiment can be found on
Table 6. Results highlighted in bold represent the
statistically higher team joint utility configurations
for each negotiation scenario (ANOVA, α = 0.05).
As it can be observed, the risk seeking configura-
tion usually gets a higher team joint utility as long
as the opponent faced is not a competitor. This
configuration is able to obtain one of the best team
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joint in all negotiation scenarios with Nice Tit-for-
Tat, Boulware, and Conceder. When negotiating
against Agent K , many negotiations end with fail-
ure since the opponent also has high aspirations.
Other opponents like Nice Tit-for-Tat, Boulware,
or Conceder match the high aspirations of the risk
seeking team at one point or another of the negoti-
ation, resulting in a higher team joint utility.
The mixed configuration usually gets the next
highest team joint utility, being able to obtain sta-
tistically equivalent results in some scenarios like
negotiating against Nice Tit-for-Tat in the average
similarity scenario, and statistically higher results
like negotiations against Agent K in dissimilar sce-
narios. This configuration obtains the best team
joint utility in all of the scenarios involving against
Agent K.
The neutral configuration, obtains statistically
good results in some scenarios where team members
have similar preferences and the Bayesian mecha-
nism is able to learn the opponent preferences prop-
erly (e.g., negotiating against Agent K, some sce-
narios against Boulware and Nice Tit-for-Tat). The
risk averse configuration is only able to obtain some
of the top results in very specific scenarios like ne-
gotiations against in similar settings against Agent
K.
However, in no case any of the team configura-
tions proposed in this article is worse than SBV. All
of the results are statistically higher than those ob-
tained by SBV, except for those obtained by the risk
seeking configuration against Agent K, which are
statistically equivalent to those obtained by SBV.
Therefore, despite being affected by team hetero-
geneity, the proposed model is robust and it is able
to obtain results that are at least equal to the state-
of-the-art (i.e., SBV), outperforming it in many sit-
uations. This result supports our initial hypothesis
H11.
7. Related Work
The contributions of this article to the auto-
mated negotiation community can be divided into
two different categories: general contributions to
the field of automated negotiation, and contribu-
tions to the specific field of agent-based negotiation
teams. Next, we analyze the contributions to each
of these fields.
7.1. Automated negotiation with single individual
parties
The artificial intelligence community has focused
on bilateral or multi-party negotiations where par-
ties are composed of single individuals. The main
contribution of our work with respect to the general
field of automated negotiation is that we support
negotiation parties composed by multiple individ-
uals. Apart from that, in the next paragraphs we
discuss other contributions of our present negotia-
tion framework with respect to works in automated
negotiation.
Faratin et al. (Faratin et al., 1998) introduced
some of the most widely used families of concession
tactics in negotiation. The authors proposed con-
cession strategies for negotiation issues that are a
mix of different families of concession tactics. The
authors divide these concession tactics into three
different families: (i) time-dependent concession
tactics; (ii) behavior-dependent concession tactics;
and (iii) resource-dependent tactics. Our negotia-
tion framework also considers time as crucial ele-
ment in negotiation. Therefore, team members em-
ploy time tactics inspired in those introduced by
Faratin et al. However, the authors do not propose
any explicit preference learning mechanism.
In Zeng and Sycara (Zeng and Sycara, 1998), the
authors argue about the benefits of using Bayesian
models in negotiation and they study a bilateral
negotiation case where the buyer attempts to learn
the reservation price of the seller by updating its
beliefs with Bayesian learning. Despite the fact
that it introduces the use of Bayesian learning in
negotiation, the article only focuses on single issue
models. One of our team member models also uses
Bayesian learning as a method for learning other
agents’ preferences. The main different resides in
the fact that our Bayesian approach attempts to
model which instantiations of unpredictable issues
are acceptable for the opponent and the team in
multi-issue negotiations.
Ehtamo et al. (Ehtamo et al., 2001) propose
a mediated multi-party negotiation protocol which
looks for joint gains in an iterated way. The algo-
rithm starts from a tentative agreement and moves
in a direction according to what the agents prefer
regarding some offers’ comparison. Results showed
that the algorithm converges quickly to Pareto
optimal points. However, the work proposed by
Ehtamo et al. does not support unpredictable is-
sues and multiple individual parties.
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Klein et al. (Klein et al., 2003a) propose a me-
diated negotiation model which can be extended to
multiple parties. Their main goal is to provide so-
lutions for negotiation processes that use complex
utility functions to model agents’ preferences. The
negotiation attributes are binary and no longer in-
dependent. Our work supports multiple individual
parties and negotiation issues with unrestricted do-
main (e.g., real, integer, discrete, binary, etc.).
In Coehoorn et al. (Coehoorn and Jennings,
2004), the authors propose the use of kernel den-
sity estimation for the estimation of the importance
weights of the linear additive utility function. The
agent calculates tuples composed of the difference
between pairs of consecutive offers, the estimated
weight for the issue, and the probability density
of the weight. These tuples form a three dimen-
sional kernel that is used along the other kernels
to calculate an estimation of the real issue weight.
Our proposed model is capable of learning in nego-
tiations where domains are also composed by dis-
crete issues, which is not supported by Coehoorn
et al. Moreover, the learning mechanism proposed
for our team members deals with the information in
one single negotiation, whereas the aforementioned
mechanism learns over several negotiations.
Later, Narayanan et al.(Narayanan and Jennings,
2006) present a negotiation framework where pairs
of agents negotiate over a single issue. The authors
assume that agents’ strategies may change over
time. Non-stationary Markov chains and Bayesian
learning are employed to tackle the uncertainty in
this domain, and eventually converge towards the
optimal negotiation strategy. In our case, we fo-
cus on one single negotiation process, and our team
members learn over the information provided by the
current negotiation. Additionally, we consider ne-
gotiations where multiple issues are involved.
Another example of the use of Bayesian learning
in negotiation is presented by Buffett et al. (Buf-
fett and Spencer, 2007). In the aforementioned ar-
ticle, a bilateral framework is presented in a do-
main where agents negotiate over a set of binary
issues. A Bayesian classifier is employed to classify
opponent’s preferences into classes of preference re-
lations. Groups of similar preference relations are
grouped according to the k-means algorithm prior
to the negotiation process. Our model does not re-
quire learning prior to the negotiation, which may
require a costly learning process every negotiation
to avoid domain dependent classifiers. Moreover,
we consider any kind of issue type in the negotia-
tion domain.
Carbonneau et al. (Carbonneau et al., 2008) pro-
pose a neural network that takes as input the nego-
tiation history of a bilateral negotiation with con-
tinuous issues and an offer to make an estimation
of the opponent’s counter-offer. This approach re-
quires that an artificial neural network is trained
per negotiation case. Similarly, the same authors
propose an improvement over their previous work
in (Carbonneau et al., 2011). It aims to make a
predictive model that does not depend on the ne-
gotiation case. The model takes pairs of negotiation
issues as inputs of the neural network, where one of
the issues is considered the primary issue (i.e., inde-
pendent variable) and the other issue is considered
the secondary issue (i.e., dependent variable). Dif-
ferently to these works, our proposed model does
not rely on information from past negotiations. It
only employs information gathered in the present
process.
Robu et al.(Robu and La Poutre´, 2008) introduce
a bilateral negotiation model where agents repre-
sent their preferences by means of utility graphs.
The negotiation domain is formed of bundles of
items that can be either included or excluded in a
final deal. Utility graphs are graphical models that
relate negotiation issues that are dependent. Nodes
represent negotiation issues whereas arcs connect is-
sues that have some joint effect on the utility func-
tion (i.e., positive for complementary issues, and
negative for substitutable issues). Hence, utility
graphs represent binary dependencies between is-
sues. The authors propose a negotiation scenario
where the buyer’s preferences and the seller’s pref-
erences are modeled through utility graphs. The
seller is the agent that carries out a more thor-
ough exploration of the negotiation space in order
to search for agreements where both parties are sat-
isfied. With this purpose, the seller builds a model
of the buyer’s preferences based on historic informa-
tion of past deals and expert knowledge about the
negotiation domain. Our work does not consider
dependencies between issues, however it is capable
of supporting every type of domain for negotiation
issues (i.e., real, binary, discrete, etc.).
In (Aydog˘an and Yolum, 2012), a concept-based
learning method is proposed for modeling oppo-
nent preferences and generating well-targeted of-
fers. In that method, the preferences of the oppo-
nent are represented via disjunctive and conjunc-
tive constraints. In this article, our aim is also to
find the agreement earlier by means of learning the
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other participants’ preferences but the preferences
are represented by means of additive utility func-
tions. In our case, an offer that is rejected by the
opponent may become acceptable over time because
the opponent may concede; therefore, we choose a
probabilistic learning method.
Williams et al. (Williams et al., 2012) present
a negotiation framework for coordinating multi-
ple bilateral negotiations with different opponents.
The agent simultaneously negotiates with differ-
ent opponent in order to acquire a desired good
at the best possible condition. The framework
makes use of optimization techniques and proba-
bilistic information in order to carry out this coor-
dination. Similarly, Mansour et al. (Mansour and
Kowalczyk, 2012) present a meta-strategy for coor-
dination multiple negotiations with different sellers.
The meta-strategy adjusts the concession speed ac-
cording to the current state of the multiple nego-
tiation threads. The problem of agent-based nego-
tiation teams is different since multiple agents col-
laborate in the same party to get a deal from an
opponent, instead of competing between each other
to get an individual deal.
7.2. Agent-based negotiation teams
As far as we are concerned, only our previ-
ous works (Sanchez-Anguix et al., 2011, 2012a,b)
have considered negotiation teams in computa-
tional models. In (Sanchez-Anguix et al., 2011,
2012a) four different computational models for a
negotiation team negotiating with a single oppo-
nent are presented. These four models attempt
to gather four different minimum levels of una-
nimity regarding team decisions: representative ap-
proach (RE, no unanimity), similarity simple voting
(SSV, majority/plurality), similarity Borda voting
(SBV, semi-unanimity), and full unanimity medi-
ated (FUM, unanimity).
The RE model is based on the selection of team
members as representative of the team. The rep-
resentative acts on behalf of the group by taking
decisions according to its own negotiation strategy
and utility function.
SSV and SBV are models based on the presence
of a mediator that coordinates voting processes. In
the case of SSV, a majority voting is employed to
determine whether or not the opponent’s offer is
accepted, and a majority voting is used to select
which offer is sent from those offers proposed by
team members to be sent to the opponent. In the
case of SBV, a unanimity voting is designated as
the mechanism to decide if opponent’s offers are
accepted and Borda count is used to decide which
offer proposed by team members is sent to the oppo-
nent. In both cases, SSV and SBV team members
decide which offers are sent to the opponent using
similarity heuristics that consider the opponent’s
and team’s last offers.
FUM is a mediated model where the opponent’s
offers are evaluated by means of a unanimity vot-
ing process, and team’s offers are built issue per
issue by aggregation rules. These models were in-
troduced at AAMAS 2011 (Sanchez-Anguix et al.,
2011) as the first approach to tackle problems in-
volving negotiation teams.
Later, we studied the special properties of
FUM, given that it was the intra-tem negotiation
model capable of guaranteeing unanimity regarding
team decisions at each negotiation round (Sanchez-
Anguix et al., 2012b). We proved how unanimity
is guaranteed in FUM, how the intra-team strat-
egy us robust against certain types of manipulation
attacks, and how team members did not have incen-
tive to strongly deviate from the proposed model.
We provided a full fledged experimental analysis
of the four intra-team strategies in different negoti-
ation environments (Sanchez-Anguix et al., 2012a).
The results showed that FUM was able to guarantee
better results for the negotiation team in most ne-
gotiation scenarios. Only SBV is able to guarantee
similar results in a limited number of negotiation
cases.
Even though these four models cover different
levels of unanimity with regards to team decisions,
they were initially designed to provide solutions for
negotiation domains that are exclusively composed
by predictable and compatible issues among team
members (e.g., price, quality, and dispatch time in
a team of buyers).
Domains exclusively composed by compatible and
predictable issues among team members cover a
range of feasible negotiation domains. However, a
relatively large number of negotiation domains also
include unpredictable issues among team members.
RE, SSV, and SBV can be easily adapted to do-
mains that include unpredictable issues among team
members by using a different similarity heuristic.
FUM, the model that guarantees unanimity with
regards to team decisions, cannot be used in these
domains since, in the offer proposal mechanism, it
aggregates issue values based on the fact that all of
the negotiation issues are compatible and predictable
among team members.
34
As stated, whenever it is possible, it is desirable
for the final agreement to be unanimously accept-
able for all of the team members since the oppo-
site situation may end up in users perceiving un-
fairness, which may affect commitment to the deci-
sion, group attachment, and trust (Korsgaard et al.,
1995), and users that are not satisfied with agree-
ments found automatically may end up leaving the
electronic application.
The model proposed in this article advances the
stat of the art in agent-based negotiation teams
by solving both problems: it guarantees unanim-
ity with regards to team decisions, and it sup-
ports unpredictable negotiation issues, which were
not specifically supported in previous models. For
that matter, the negotiation domains is split be-
tween those issues that are compatible and pre-
dictable among team members, and those issues
that are unpredictable. In the former case, part
of the mechanism employed in FUM is employed.
By doing so, the model is capable of guarantee-
ing that team members are able to get as much as
they need from predictable and compatible issues.
In the latter case, the team discards those com-
binations of unpredictable partial offers that pre-
clude the team from reaching unanimously accept-
able agreements, even if the most is obtained from
predictable and compatible issues. Then, in the offer
proposal mechanism team members select one of re-
maining unpredictable partial offers, and complete
the predictable and compatible issue with the val-
ues that they need to make it at least unanimously
acceptable. The idea behind this splitting, is coop-
erating as much as possible on those issues that are
predictable and compatible among team members
to create less intra-team conflict in unpredictable
issues.
8. Conclusions & Future Work
In this article we have presented a new me-
diated team negotiation model for a team as a
multi-individual party negotiating with an oppo-
nent in the alternating offers protocol. The present
model is capable of assuring unanimously accept-
able agreements for all of the team members. It
takes advantage of the categorization of negotia-
tion issues as predictable and compatible, and un-
predictable. The former are those issues whose
preferential order over issue values is known from
the negotiation domain and it is common among
team members (e.g., price in a team of buyers),
whereas the latter are those issues whose prefer-
ential order over issues values is not known in the
negotiation domain. In the case of predictable and
compatible issues, there is full potential for coop-
eration among team members since if one of the
team members demands more from the issue, the
other team members are also benefited. Our negoti-
ation model takes advantage of this property. Dur-
ing the pre-negotiation, each team member shares
with a team mediator those unpredictable partial
offers (i.e., partial offers that have all of the unpre-
dictable issues instantiated) that, even if the team
demands the most from predictable issues, preclude
the agent from achieving its reservation value. A
joint list forbidden unpredictable partial offers is
constructed by the team mediator from the lists re-
ceived from the team members. In the negotiation,
the team mediator coordinates a unanimity voting
process to decide whether or not to accept offers
received from the opponent. As for the mechanism
employed to decide on which offer should be sent to
the opponent, the team mediator coordinates two
processes: a proposing and voting process where
each team member suggests an unpredictable par-
tial offer not included in the forbidden list followed
by a Borda voting on candidates received, and an
iterated process where predictable issues are set is-
sue per issue attending to the demands of the team
members.
We have proposed two different types of team
members for the current model: a basic team mem-
ber that proposes unpredictable partial offers dur-
ing the negotiation solely guided by its own utility
function, and a Bayesian team member that sug-
gests unpredictable partial offers based on the pref-
erences of the team and the preferences of the op-
ponent. Results have shown that, as long as pref-
erential conflict is present in the team, team mem-
bers have an incentive to employ the Bayesian strat-
egy over the basic strategy. In any case, we have
shown that both approaches outperform other ex-
isting models for negotiation teams. Moreover, we
have determined that when two negotiation teams
face each other, both teams benefit from includ-
ing Bayesian team members in the negotiation. Fi-
nally, we have shown that team members may ben-
efit from playing higher reservation utilities against
conceders, matchers and inverters. Nevertheless,
setting high reservation utilities may become the
worst option as team members’ preferences are
more dissimilar and the opponent plays a competi-
tor strategy.
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The topic of agent-based negotiation teams re-
mains largely unexplored compared to negotiation
involving single individual parties. The present
work has focused on agent-based negotiation teams
where team members have different preferences but
they share the same knowledge regarding the nego-
tiation domain. One potential area of research is
modeling negotiation teams where team members
differ in their knowledge of the negotiation domain
and their skills related to the negotiation process.
As another line of future work, one could consider
the problem of forming negotiation teams based on
the individual list of unpredictable partial offers.
Lists that are more similar may suggest team mem-
bers that are more similar, which, if put together
in the same team, may result in more cooperative
teams. Related to team formation, dynamic nego-
tiation teams where team members may join and
leave the team during the negotiation can be con-
sidered an alternative line of research.
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